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ESSAY
THE STRANGE CAREER OF
TITLE VII’S § 703(M): AN ESSAY ON THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
JEFFREY A. VAN DETTA†
I
In this Symposium, we mark the fiftieth anniversary of the
enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a feat of
legislative progress that coalesced around the vigorous advocacy
of a number of grass-roots efforts and more than a few political
figures. On that July evening half of a century ago, the New
York Times special report on the signing of the bill concisely
captured the essence of its importance:
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 tonight.
It is the most far-reaching civil rights law since Reconstruction
days.1
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†
John E. Ryan Professor of International Business & Workplace Law, Atlanta’s
John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Georgia. The title of this Essay was in part
inspired, of course, by the title of C. Vann Woodward’s iconic book, The Strange
Career of Jim Crow (Baton Rouge, 1955). See Howard N. Rabinowitz, More Than the
Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Career of Jim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIST. 842
(1988). I dedicate this Essay to two people who have profoundly influenced and
inspired me: my friend and faculty colleague for over a dozen years, Professor Helen
Hickey de Haven, a profoundly talented and creative teacher and scholar of labor
and employment law, who was kind enough to read an earlier draft of this Essay and
share comments with me; and to the late Professor Robert Belton, a pioneer in
bringing the law of employment discrimination into the curriculum of America’s law
schools and with whose casebook I first taught the course. See Grace Renshaw,
Robert Belton, Trailblazing Scholar of Employment Law, Dies, VANDERBILT NEWS
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2012/02/robert-belton-obituary/.
1
E.W. Kenworthy, President Signs Civil Rights Bill; Bids All Back It, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1964, at 1, available at http://partners.nytimes.com/library/
national/race/070364race-ra.html.
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The presidential signature was affixed on the same day that the
author turned two years of age—July 2, 1964. Thus, it is fair to
say that the author did not experience the world before Title VII.
Rather, the author has grown up—literally—with Title VII.
One of the earliest commentators on the then newly enacted
law was Francis Vaas, a partner at Boston’s Ropes & Gray law
firm, who chronicled its legislative history.2 In surveying a wide
array of issues and features under the employment provisions of
the Civil Rights Act, Mr. Vaas wrote the following prophetic
lines:

That clarification was a long time in coming. Indeed, it was
not until the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“1991 CRA”) that
Congress—seeking to reverse the effects of a string of rulings by
the Reagan Supreme Court—made a legislative effort to do so.
Yes, even when it had arrived, few recognized that it had come.
In its first twenty-five years, the causation question in Title
VII was a subject of inconclusive discussion. In 1982, eighteen
years into the Title VII era, one commentator observed:
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2
See generally Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431
(1966).
3
Id. at 456–57 (footnotes omitted) (citing NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publ’g Co., 320
F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J., concurring); Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v.
NLRB, 296 F.2d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d
883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953); Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 783, 787 (8th Cir.
1940)).
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Of comparable significance may be the Senate’s rejection of
numerous other amendments proposed during the Senate
debate but withdrawn or rejected during cloture [sic]. For
example, Senator McClellan proposed that an unfair
employment practice should be found to exist only when the
discrimination complained of was solely because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. This proposal was rejected. The
fact that it was made points up what is a continuing issue under
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). For an unfair
employment practice to exist, what must be the causal nexus or
relationship between the improper motive and the overt act?
Must the improper motive be the dominant factor, a substantial
contributing factor or merely a factor leading to the overt act?
The answers to these questions await the clarification of the law
by administrative practice and judicial decision. Presumably
court decisions under the LMRA will be the more reliable and
significant guide, rather than the more onerous interpretation
which the NLRB has occasionally applied.3
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Various formulations of the appropriate standard of causation
for disparate treatment actions have been suggested in the
decisional law and elsewhere. At one end of the spectrum is a
test, specifically rejected by Congress, that requires the plaintiff
to establish that the unlawful factor was the sole factor behind
the decision. At the other end is a causal theory that prohibits a
decision that was based in part on an impermissible
consideration even if a legitimate reason was also relied on. In
between is a test that would invalidate personnel action that
was based in substantial part on a discriminatory ground, and
another that requires the plaintiff to prove that the
impermissible consideration was a determinative factor, i.e., a
factor that made a difference in the ultimate result.4

The issue was one of real importance, as Professor Brodin
explained in language that is rarely seen anymore in the
technocratic opinions of the federal courts:
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4
Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 293 (1982) (footnotes
omitted).
5
Id. at 317 (footnotes omitted).
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[There are] congressional and judicial pronouncements that the
primary objective (or at least one primary objective) of title VII
is the elimination of discrimination in employment
opportunities. With this deterrence goal in mind, why should a
plaintiff be required, in order to establish a violation, to go
beyond proving that race or another forbidden criterion was a
motivating factor in the decision? Put differently, should an
employer be permitted to avoid liability completely by showing
that his consideration of the unlawful factor happened in this
particular instance to be “harmless”?
Considering that
discriminatory criteria are by definition aimed against groups,
it is at least probable that such an employer is engaged in
discriminatory decisionmaking regarding its other minority or
female employees and applicants as well. As such, a samedecision causal theory is not likely to provide the “spur or
catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and
to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of their
discriminatory practices. Indeed, the refusal of the courts to
take some action against such “harmless” discrimination might
actually encourage the continuation of such conduct.5
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What appeared to be confusing to the courts was an unusual
feature of Title VII, compared to other legislation:
“[C]laims under Title VII involve the vindication of a major
public interest.” The statute was enacted against a background
of hundreds of years of racism and racial violence and
represents a congressional determination that continued
discrimination in employment is against the public interest. In
focusing solely on the impact of discrimination on the litigant
who has chosen to challenge it, the same-decision standard
represents “an attempt to individualize or personalize an evil or
wrong that is basically an institutional wrong.” Congress has
relied primarily on private litigants for the judicial enforcement
of title VII, thus imbuing these private actions with a social
function unaddressed [by looking solely at a Title VII claim as
an individual plaintiff’s cause of action].6

6
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Id. at 319–20 (footnotes omitted).
See infra notes 28–42 and accompanying text.
8
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206
(1993). Celotex itself has provoked continued debate, as the exemplified by Arthur
Miller’s denunciation and by Adam Steinman’s attempt at rehabilitation. Arthur R.
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984–85 (2003); Adam N. Steinman, The
Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty
Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 85–86 (2006).
9
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
7
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A watershed event in the ability of the private attorneys
general to enforce Title VII and other Employment
Discrimination Law (“EDL”) statutes in federal court was the
issuance of the canonical Celotex trilogy in 1986,7 which, as
Professor McGinley pointed out over twenty years ago, “ha[s] had
perhaps an even more devastating effect on civil rights law than
the substantive decisions of the 1989 cases” because the Celotex
trilogy “changed the manner in which courts approach summary
judgment, making it easier for defendants to obtain summary
judgment in cases of at least arguable discrimination,” which,
prior to the trilogy, included a palpable “reluctan[ce] to grant
summary judgment to a defendant in a civil rights case where
questions of motive, intent and credibility existed.”8
The 1991 CRA, then, held great promise when it responded
to the provocation of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins9 to address a
larger problem—the problem that Francis Vaas identified in
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1966.
However, the often-invoked canon of statutory
construction—start and stop with the text unless it is necessary
to go to the legislative history to figure out what an ambiguous
text means10—has been tossed to the side, and the contextual
history of overruling Price Waterhouse has been invoked by
normally textualist judges who refuse to believe that Congress
actually meant what it wrote. It is upon that sobering reality
that we must reflect, even as we celebrate Title VII’s
achievements over the last half century.11
II
As I argued in a trio of articles a decade ago, Congress
thought it had solved the causation question in its legislation
overturning the 1989 United States Supreme Court cases, the
Civil Rights Act of 199112 (“1991 CRA”). Yet, the critical
provision that solved the causation question posed by Vaas in
1966—§ 703(m),13 added to Title VII by § 107 of the 1991 CRA
and captioned as Clarifying Prohibition Against Impermissible
10
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
OF LEGAL TEXTS 56–68, 369–90, 397–98 (2012).

LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
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11
Shortly after the 1991 CRA became law, Professor Robert Belton published a
presciently titled article on that law. See Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921 (1993). At that time, Professor
Belton observed:
The Congressional compromise that was necessary to enact the 1991 Act
raises a host of issues that are not unlike those the courts had to address
during the first decade of developments under Title VII. . . . [T]he
denouement of the 1991 Act rests initially with the federal courts as it did
during the first decade of the 1964 Act. How the courts respond to the
issues raised by the new act will determine whether TitleVII, the ADA, the
ADEA, and section 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act, are to be revived as
potent tools for the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, or
whether they will again be reduced to, in the words of Judge Sobeloff,
“mellifluous but hollow rhetoric.”
Id. at 964. Professor Belton’s article, however, did not seem to prognosticate how
summary judgment would evolve to become the most serious item on the 1991 CRA’s
“unfinished agenda.”
12
See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as
Countermonument to McDonnell Douglas—A Countermemory Reply to
Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort”
Redux: Section 703(m), Costa, McDonnell Douglas, and the Title VII Revolution—A
Reply, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 427 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le
Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation
of Every Title VII Case After Desert Hotels v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003) [hereinafter Van Detta, Vive Le Roi!].
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
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Consideration of Race, Color, Religion, Sex, or National Origin in
Employment Practices14—received little attention from the
federal courts before the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa,15 where the Court held that a jury
instruction on § 703(m)’s “motivating factor” standard was
warranted in a case that presented as the classic McDonnellDouglas-Burdine pretext paradigm.16 But as it has turned out in
the intervening eleven years since 2003, Costa changed next to
nothing. Many commentators, and almost all federal courts,
refused to believe that Congress could have intended to answer
the profound question left open in 1964 in such a way, without
leaving legislative history to make that clear.17 The absurdity of
the position—that we cannot read a statute to say what it says
because the legislative history does not confirm that the statute
says it—certainly plays into the court of Justice Scalia’s pointed
criticisms of the use of legislative history.18
What the lower federal courts appear to refuse to believe is
that Congress would have left it in the hands of a jury to
determine whether an adverse employment action taken against,
for example, an African-American employee was in some
discernable way motivated by that employee’s race—for example,
in which race was “a motivating factor.”19 The lower federal

14

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (“In order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.’ ”).
16
See, e.g., Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and in with the New: The
Second Circuit Shows It’s Time for the Supreme Court To Finally Overrule
McDonnell Douglas, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 148–49 (2004).
17
See, e.g., Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well,
52 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 400 (2004); Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a
Theory of Discrimination: The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 1 (2005).
18
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (elaborating on the arguments for textual
fidelity and for eschewing reliance on legislative history); Antonin Scalia & John F.
Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1610, 1611–13, 1615–17 (2012). For more nuanced and sophisticated
principles for the proper use of legislative history, rather than an absolutist rejection
of it, see Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 90–134 (2012).
19
The United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit gave a typical
statement of this position in Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co., 416
F.3d 310, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2005).
15

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 250 Side B
04/08/2016 13:04:55

C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 251 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_VANDETTA.DOC

2015]

STRANGE CAREER OF TITLE VII’S § 703(M)

3/24/16 2:17 PM

889

courts explained away the language as merely a modification of
the Price Waterhouse case’s discussion of a special class of cases
where the decision makers were foolhardy enough to make
explicit their consideration of the employee’s protected
characteristic.20 Even the lone federal district court judge who
clearly saw the effect of the 1991 CRA right from the start—Paul
Magnuson of the District of Minnesota21—finally threw in the

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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20
See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse
Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004); see also Robert
Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief
Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000); Robert A. Kearney, The
High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of Discrimination, 5
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 303 (2003); Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do as She Does, Not as
She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332 (1996); Michael A.
Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements
in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 959 (1994).
21
See, for example, Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 739 (8th Cir.
2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring), in which Judge Magnuson’s views are most clearly
and forcefully exposited:
For thirty years, courts have been slaves to the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting paradigm that is inconsistent with Title VII. McDonnell Douglas
cannot be reconciled with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as it is indignant to
the clear text of the statute. McDonnell Douglas impermissibly focuses on
the but-for cause of the employment decision, when all that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 requires is that discrimination be a motivating factor in the
employment decision. Because a plaintiff need not demonstrate that
discrimination was the but-for cause in the employment decision, all cases
under Title VII should be evaluated to determine whether invidious
discrimination in any way influenced or motivated the employment
decision. McDonnell Douglas fails to always achieve this result, while the
motivating factor test consistently does.
McDonnell Douglas should not be used by courts to analyze Title VII
claims. The burden-shifting framework is not supported in the language of
the statute, nor does it impose liability under Title VII as Congress
intended. Under McDonnell Douglas, requiring the employer to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision is worthless.
Id. at 745. Although his views did not carry the day, Judge Magnuson forcefully
recounted how the courts have wrought complexity out of what Congress constructed
simply:
In 1991, Congress extended the protection of the Civil Rights Act, which
until that point only prohibited employment decisions motivated primarily
by an improper characteristic such as race or gender. In amending the Civil
Rights Act in 1991, Congress sought to prohibit any consideration of race or
other improper characteristic, no matter how slight, in employment
decisions. Despite this clear language, courts continued to apply a test that
determined whether a discriminatory motive was the necessary and
sufficient cause of an employment decision, not one to determine whether a
discriminatory motive played a lesser role in the employment decision.
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towel when, after sitting by designation on a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in which the court
did not adopt the view he set forth in Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,22 he wrote in a district court decision:
Although this Court is bound to follow the law as interpreted in
the Eighth Circuit, the Court notes its disagreement with the
Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
clarified that a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment
practice when he or she “demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.”
Rather than prohibiting only employment
decisions motivated primarily by discrimination, Congress
sought to impose liability on the employer if discrimination was
a motivating factor, no matter how slight, in the employment
decision.
This amendment eviscerated the indirect/direct
evidence distinction articulated in Price Waterhouse. Without
this evidentiary distinction, McDonnell Douglas should have
fallen into disuse and the “motivating factor” test articulated in
the amendment should have emerged. Nevertheless, courts
have ignored the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and have duly
followed Price Waterhouse. Though this Court has opined that
Desert Palace signaled the demise of McDonnell Douglas, the
Eighth Circuit has found otherwise. Bound by this precedent,
this Court must analyze [the plaintiff’s] claims accordingly.23
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Courts ignored the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in 1991, and they continue to
ignore this congressional mandate today. Desert Palace exposes the legal
fiction for what it is, and in its wake, I can no longer adhere to or apply an
arbitrary and antiquated test that has been superceded by Congress.
Id. at 739.
22
267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994 (D. Minn. 2003).
23
Klyuch v. Freightmasters, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 788, 793 (D. Minn. 2005)
(Magnuson, J.) (citations omitted).
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In addition, other circuit courts have continued to struggle
with squaring § 703(m) with pre-1991 jurisprudence.24 Some of
these courts, however, have at least seen that the district courts’
tendency to see stark, categorical distinctions between
circumstantial evidence cases and direct evidence cases can lead
to grants of summary judgment that are unsustainable on
appeal.25
III
The great tragedy—one truly of national proportions—is that
the federal courts’ incredulity at the plain language of the 1991
CRA’s § 703(m) is actually fueled by another well-meaning, but

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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24
E.g., Pheng Vuong v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 360 F. App’x 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“When analyzing a claim of unlawful employment discrimination, we proceed under
either the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green or under the
‘mixed-motive’ analysis of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.” (citations omitted));
Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The Desert Palace
decision has proved ripe terrain for scholarly debate over how that decision interacts
with the McDonnell Douglas framework. Suffice it to say that the two decisions have
not been definitively disentangled or reconciled . . . .” (citation omitted)); White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 n.10 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We decline to
adopt the view, proposed by some courts and commentators, that the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine framework has ceased to exist entirely following Desert Palace.”);
Diamond, 416 F.3d at 316–17 (rejecting the arguments that “Desert Palace ‘makes it
clear that . . . all Title VII cases are to be analyzed as mixed motive cases’ and that
the ‘shifting burden’ test first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green . . . no longer applies at the summary judgment stage and a plaintiff can
‘avert’ summary judgment simply by establishing a ‘prima facie case’ of
discrimination” (first omission in original)); Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407
F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Desert Palace had no effect on pretext cases under
McDonnell Douglas.”); Watson v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 211, 217
(3d Cir. 2000) (opinion by then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito) (addressing whether
§ 107(a) of the 1991 CRA eliminated the distinction between the standards of
causation applicable to “pretext” and “mixed-motive” cases and holding that “[w]hile
we certainly do not pretend that the text of Section 107(a) speaks with unmistakable
clarity, the text suggests to us that Section 107(a) was designed to apply only to
Price Waterhouse ‘mixed-motive’ cases”); Rozskowiak v. Vill. of Arlington Heights,
2004 WL 816432, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2004) (“Having reviewed Desert Palace,
and in the absence of binding authority to the contrary, the court declines to adopt
the Dare court’s analysis and concludes that McDonnell Douglas remains a viable
framework for evaluating summary judgment motions.”).
25
Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46 (“We reject the district court’s requirement that
Miller’s words explicitly indicate that Chadwick’s sex was the basis for Miller’s
assumption about Chadwick’s inability to balance work and home. To require such
an explicit reference (presumably use of the phrase ‘because you are a woman,’ or
something similar) to survive summary judgment would undermine the concept of
proof by circumstantial evidence, and would make it exceedingly difficult to prove
most sex discrimination cases today.” (footnote omitted)).
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ultimately disastrous, statutory enactment. That enactment is
the 1991 CRA itself.26 The 1991 CRA both created and undid its
own promising prospects; or, more precisely, the Congress that
drafted and enacted the 1991 CRA undid it from the beginning.
Just how did Congress manage this to reach this zenith of
ineffectual impotence?
By pushing too far—by changing the character of Title VII by
engrafting onto a statute, which up to that time had
accomplished more in the American workplace than any other
single law than perhaps the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”)—the double albatrosses of (a) tort-like damages such as
compensatory and punitive damages and (b) tort-like
adjudication in the form of jury trials. The provision of which I
speak is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a—the provision that took
Title VII cases from the bench trial to the jury trial. Coming on
the heels of the Celotex trilogy, this transformation could not
have been more ill timed.
From 1964 to 1991, Title VII cases were bench trials.27 Why
should that make a difference? It makes a difference because it
is one thing for a federal district judge to decide whether a case
should be resolved on summary judgment but another thing for a
judge to decide through a bench trial. As Judge Richard Posner
observed in an age discrimination case litigated prior to the 1991
CRA, because “the usual factfinder in an age discrimination case
is a jury, not a judge as in a Title VII case,” the “judge’s decision

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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26
For a good account of the background leading up to the 1991 CRA, see
William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the Reagan Years
(1980–89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645
(1994).
27
See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1239 n.5, 1242 (N.D.
Ga. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Comment, Right to
Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 168
(1969); Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 417, 419 (1973). But see Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 717 F. Supp. 781, 784 (N.D. Ala. 1989), aff’d on reconsideration, 723 F. Supp.
635 (N.D. Ala. 1989); Charles A. Horowitz, Judge Acker’s Last Stand: The Northern
District of Alabama's Lonesome Battle for the Right to Trial by Jury Under Title VII,
39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 136–37 (1991). In a subsequent case,
Walton v. Cowin Equipment Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit set Judge Acker straight, “[T]he Eleventh Circuit held that a
binding jury trial is forbidden in a Title VII case, which the Eleventh Circuit finds
always to be ‘equitable.’ ” 774 F. Supp. 1343, 1344 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (citing Walton v.
Cowin Equip. Co., 930 F.2d 924 (11th Cir. 1991), which reversed Judge Acker’s
initial decision reported at 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1990)).
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Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990).
See Dianne LaRocca, The Bench Trial: A More Beneficial Alternative to
Arbitration of Title VII Claims, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 954–57 (2005).
30
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 310–12 (2013). But see Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of
Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 861, 862 (2007) (arguing that the authors’ empirical analysis “call[s] into
question the interpretation that the [Celotex] trilogy led to expansive increases in
summary judgment” and asserting “that changes in civil rules and federal casemanagement practices prior to the trilogy may have been more important in
bringing about changes in summary judgment practice”).
31
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2012).
29

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 253 Side A

to grant a motion for summary judgment may be a good predictor
of the outcome of a bench trial before the same judge; it may not
be a good predictor of the outcome before a jury.”28
The judge reading the summary judgment papers might very
well want to hear testimony before reaching a ruling in the case.
In holding a bench trial, the judge has not increased the risk of
error; additionally, bench trials in individual Title VII cases are
not inordinately lengthy.29
Committing to a jury trial is another thing altogether. This
is where the Celotex trilogy works its greatest effect. The cases
were written on the implicit assumption that juries cannot be
trusted in close cases where judges are not impressed with the
evidence.30 Trying a case by a jury requires a much more
substantial investment of time and resources than trying a bench
trial. It also limits when the cases can be tried because there
must be a venire in summons from which to draw juries.
Moreover, when juries are on hand, federal judges have
enormous pressure to employ the jurors for pending criminal
prosecutions, which have grown exponentially since Title VII
became law in 1964, and that pressure, under the suffocating
weight of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial command, has
been incredibly deleterious to the trial of civil cases in federal
courts.
Even where these institutional concerns are not
substantial, the federal judges are also well aware of how much
more challenging it is for them to manage a jury trial and how
many more opportunities there are for error, both in evidentiary
rulings as well as the charges to the jury.
Thus, it is my contention that the rise of the Celotex trilogy
in 1986 followed closely after by the 1991 CRA’s jury trial
provision31 have synergistically combined to undermine
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enforcement of Title VII by individuals seeking to vindicate the
values of the statute through lawsuits as private attorneys
general.32
The jury-trial element has perversely—even if
subconsciously—increased judicial anxiety about having juries
decide Employment Discrimination Law (“EDL”) claims. That
anxiety in turn, I argue, has increased judicial willingness to use
summary judgment as a jury-control device. This tendency was
identified in Age Employment Driscrimination Act (“ADEA”)
cases before the well-meaning sponsors of the 1991 CRA
expanded the jury trial right to Title VII.33 Under the reign of
the 1991 CRA, the effect on Title VII cases has been devastating.
An entire class of cases—filed under a law34 designed to eradicate
the most invidious forms of discrimination known in America by
expanding the scope of actionable discrimination, placing fact
finding in the hands of peer juries and enhancing remediation of
the harm caused by discrimination—has been effectively
excluded from the federal courts.35
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32
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 73–74 (2010).
33
Shager, 913 F.2d at 403. Judge Posner’s astute-as-usual observation was that
because “the usual factfinder in an age discrimination case is a jury, not a judge,”
the judicial angst that tempted judges to grant summary judgment in cases that the
judge deemed “marginal” had a distorting effect: “A judge’s decision to grant a
motion for summary judgment may be a good predictor of the outcome of a bench
trial before the same judge; it may not be a good predictor of the outcome before a
jury.” Id. at 403.
34
Other scholars have focused on the empirics that suggest that plaintiffs have
an average forty percent success rate in Title VII cases that do make it to juries,
whereas they have a success rate only in the twenties for Title VII bench trials. See,
e.g., Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281, 302 n.100 (2011). That is all
very well—but the plaintiff has to make it past Rule 56 to reach a jury, and even
those plaintiffs that prevail before a jury find further menace in the district court’s
power to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in the form of Rule 50(b) motions for
judgment as a matter of law and Rule 59 new trial motions. Ash v. Tyson Foods Inc.,
129 F. App’x 529 (11th Cir. 2005), provides a classic example of that denouement.
See infra Part IV.
35
See generally Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today’s
Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 209 (2011). In introducing her empirical study
of jury verdicts in those Title VII cases that manage to survive the scythe of Rule
56’s grim reaper, Professor Parker observed:
[The 1991 CRA] was thought to be a victory for employment discrimination
plaintiffs—a “dramatic” expansion of their rights. Twenty years later,
however, we are told that the news for employment discrimination
plaintiffs has gone “from bad to worse.” Employment discrimination
plaintiffs should expect defendants to win their pretrial motions. Even if
plaintiffs survive pretrial practice, they will likely lose at trial. Other than
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This is not just a hunch on my part. Empirical data on the
rate at which EDL cases are currently being dispatched on
summary judgment by the federal courts amply justifies the
concern.36 Poor prospects for running the Rule 56 and 50 motions
gauntlet, now enhanced by the effect of Twiqbal37 and the return
of factual pleading,38 also have a suppressive effect on plaintiffs’
willingness to stay the course, leading to earlier and more
frequent settlements than we otherwise would expect if Title VII
were functioning in the way Congress meant for it to function.39
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settlement, the chances of any plaintiff recovery are quite thin.
Employment discrimination plaintiffs, or perhaps their lawyers, seem to
have gotten the message. Employment discrimination suits are
declining—even while [EEOC] filings are increasing. Federal litigation is
becoming less and less relevant to redressing employment discrimination.
Id. at 209–10 (footnotes omitted).
36
See, e.g., Hon. Richard G. Kopf, Civil Jury Trials, Summary Judgment,
Employment Cases and the Northern District of Georgia Study—Preliminary
Observations, HERCULES & UMPIRE (Oct. 22, 2013), http://herculesand
theumpire.com/2013/10/22/civil-jury-trials-summary-judgment-employment-cases-an
d-the-northern-district-of-georgia-study-preliminary-observations;
Memorandum
from Joe Cecil & George Cort to Judge Michael Baylson (Aug. 13, 2008), available at
www.uscourts.gov/file/sujulrs2pdf.
37
Cristina Calvar, Note, “Twiqbal”: A Political Tool, 37 J. LEGIS. 200, 202 n.21
(2012) (“The nickname ‘Twiqbal’ has gained increasing popularity when collectively
referring to the heightened pleading requirements set forth by Twombly and Iqbal.”
(citing Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54
(2010))). The term has even entered the vernacular of some judges. See, e.g., RHJ
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“In the
past, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) was
analyzed under the same standard as a 12(b)(6) motion, wherein the Court must
‘accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.’ . . . That was the standard. No longer. There is a ‘new sheriff in town’ now
policing FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (c), and his name is ‘Twiqbal.’ ”).
38
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 32, at 14, 19–20; Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal
Courthouse Doors Closing? What's Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 593–94 (2011) (adapting Miller’s remarcks at
the inaugural Walter B. Huffman Distinguished Lecture Series); see also Miller,
supra note 30, at 346.
39
Professor Miller’s articles cited supra note 38 in the previous footnote amply
demonstrate this point.
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This put Title VII in the federal judiciary’s metaphorical
crosshairs, and it has not been able to escape since.40 In fact,
Congress walked right into the buzzsaw of the revolution that
the Supreme Court’s 1986 Celotex trilogy41 had ignited in the
aggressive use of summary judgment to clear civil dockets42 in
order to make way for the Sixth Amendment pressurized federal
criminal prosecutions which had begun to suck up—most
unnecessarily43—the vast majority of every federal district court’s
attention and time.44
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40
One eminent jurist to recently write on the subject, the Honorable Denny
Chin, sees the situation rather differently—and perhaps things were different in his
federal district courtroom, given the introspection Judge Chin offers in his article
and his previous scholarship on the subject. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge's Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
671 (2012–13); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A
Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 659 (1998).
41
See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
42
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1348 (2005) (noting
that the trilogy “altered well-established summary judgment practice,
and . . . decisively opened the eyes of the federal courts” to the potential for summary
judgment to control civil dockets).
43
See Roger J. Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some
Prescriptions for Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 151, 165–66 (1987).
44
An illuminating discussion of these problems from a view in the trenches may
be found in Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s
Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade
Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 685, 688 (2012–13). Judge Bennett sits on the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa and authored one of
the early cases trying to mediate between Costa and McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine.
See Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190–
1200 (N.D. Iowa 2003); see also Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735–36
(8th Cir. 2004) (“Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary
judgment decisions.”); Jones v. Cargill, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1003 n.8 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (“The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly disavowed Dunbar in
Griffith v. City of Des Moines.”). I must concede here that Judge Bennett was kind
enough to single out one of my articles—and particularly its discussion of his
Dunbar opinion—both for attention and a bit of skewering over my use of a
sophisticated metaphor, from—Egads!—the realm of astronomy, to illustrate a
simple point. See Mark Bennett, Remarks at Panel III Celebrating the 40th
Anniversary of Title VII: Closing the Gaps—Making Title VII More Effective for All:
Damages, Jury Trials, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (June 30, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/40th/panel/40thpanels/panel3/trans
cript.html). Touché. I was an amateur astronomer in my teenage years during the
1970s, and it did not occur to me the metaphor would be seen as egg-headed by an
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experienced federal judge. I would be delighted to share with Judge Bennett my
personal copy of J.L.E. DREYER, A HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY FROM THALES TO KEPLER
(1906), a classic that is unfortunately neglected in our twenty-first century world.
45
See Van Detta, Vive Le Roi!, supra note 12, at 81–85.
46
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 411–12 (2011).
47
See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 1431, 1432–34 (2012).
48
See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013); Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend
Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107 (2014); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort
Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
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The “tortification” of Title VII—a perhaps crude but
evocative word that I choose here to never let us forget just how
unwarranted and unnatural has been the raiment with which
the 1991 CRA forcibly fitted Title VII—creates many
disadvantages for the evolution of civil rights in our country, for
the eradication of discrimination in our workplaces, and for the
attainment of the amended Title VII’s § 703(m) goals of
lightening the terrifically difficult burden of proof in these
supposedly “post-racial” times. I myself argued in prior writings
that Title VII is a statutory tort, but I did so in a metaphorical
sense. My focus was on comparing the effect of a prima face case
of tort to a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and
the other EDL statutes.45 I certainly did not intend to suggest
that the limiting doctrines on negligence invented by nineteenth
and early twentieth century courts to protect business interests
should be applied to Title VII. Yet, the Roberts-Retro Supreme
Court has apparently espoused that view in its most unfortunate
recent decision in Proctor v. Staub Hospital,46 where the Court
purported to interpolate proximate causation doctrine from the
common law of tort into the law of federal employment
discrimination.47 I renounce the extension of the tort label to
that totally unwarranted degree. No one has better chronicled
and exposed the ills of tortification than Professor Sandra
Sperino of the University of Cincinnati College of Law. In a
series of well thought out, closely argued, and incontrovertibly
reasoned publications, Professor Sperino has found the tort label,
as she more elegantly calls it, to be—as I would put it somewhat
more proactively than might she—the scarlet letter that has
created a virtual judicial banishment of the statute to the
hinterlands of the federal court docket and of Congress’s
enforcement agenda.48
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Perhaps Congress thought that tortifying Title VII, while at
the same time lightening the plaintiff’s metaphysical burden of
proof, would attract more attorneys to represent wronged
individuals in the process that the 1964 Congress saw as key to
the success of Title VII—the prosecution of individual lawsuits as
private attorneys general, which inspired the fee-shifting
provisions of § 706(k)49 that suspended the operation of the
traditional American rule50 allowing reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing plaintiff.51 But quite the opposite has happened
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49
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(k), 78 Stat. 259, 261
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2012)).
50
Fox v. Vice, 563 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (discussing the traditional American
rule which “requires each party to bear his own litigation expenses, including
attorney’s fees, regardless whether he wins or loses” while noting that “Congress has
authorized courts to deviate from this background rule in certain types of cases by
shifting fees from one party to another”); see Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth
Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of
Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1093 n.19
(2007) (discussing “a private attorney general exception to the American rule that
each party pays its own lawyer”).
51
See, e.g., Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 50, at 1093 n.24 (“Courts generally
interpret ‘prevailing party’ fee-shifting statutes to permit asymmetrical recovery:
Prevailing plaintiffs generally recover fees as a matter of course, but prevailing
defendants recover their fees only when the plaintiff’s action was ‘frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless.’ This interpretation avoids deterring plaintiffs from
bringing good faith civil rights claims when success is uncertain.” (citing
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)) (citation omitted));
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1341 1346–52 (2012) (“This model is known
as the ‘private’ attorney general because it effectively delegates pursuit of the
statute’s public goals to private parties.”). Professor Johnson insightfully elaborated:
The primacy of the private attorney general model was not inevitable, but
it has become the central conception of civil rights enforcement for good
reason: In the end, it was the best deal that civil rights advocates could get
from Congress. When Congress debated the fair employment provisions of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, civil rights supporters initially pursued a
bureaucratic enforcement regime of resolving complaints, modeled on the
National Labor Relations Act and state fair employment practices
commissions. The administrative agency would investigate charges,
determine if probable cause existed, conciliate claims, and if conciliation
failed, prosecute claims before the agency’s quasi-judicial board. This initial
model made administrative enforcement exclusive, with no private right to
sue in court. For civil rights proponents, the administrative process was
superior to the judicial process: cheaper, quicker, less complex, more
flexible, and more predictable and coherent than private litigation. But
after opponents resisted the creation of powerful federal administrative
agencies with the authority to resolve civil rights claims, private
enforcement emerged as the compromise.
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because the federal judiciary has stepped in—steeped in horror
and dread of runaway juries, magnet fora, opened floodgates of
litigation, and, frankly, overenforcement. Indeed, the federal
courts have evidenced in deed if not in word an attitude toward
Title VII that seems to bubble up from the same unhappy
wellspring of thought with which New York’s Justice Joseph
Bradley wrote in the Civil Rights Cases52 that protected classes—
in that case, African Americans—were being treated as “special
favorite[s] of the laws,” as he struck down the 1964 Civil Rights
Act’s predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In short, if the
cases go down in flames from the beginning, the incentives for
vindication of Title VII through the activities of “private
attorneys general”53 fall nearly to a subminus zero.54 Judge
Richard Posner recognized this in a case some twenty years
ago—and although he recognized this, he opined that the federal
courts had little power to correct the situation:
The practical inability of a plaintiff in a Title VII case to get
past summary judgment unless he presents evidence other than
what comes out of his own mouth could be thought troubling.
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Id. at 1351 (footnotes omitted); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private
Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 186 (2003) (“Virtually all modern civil
rights statutes rely heavily on private attorneys general.”). For a discussion on the
further nuances that have come to characterize the “private attorney general”
concept in American law, see William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney
General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2130–31 (2004).
52
109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid
of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of
a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights
as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men’s rights are protected.”).
53
For the origin of this term, see Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Development, 20 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 225, 227 n.12 (1976); see also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
413–15 (1975).
54
See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 50, at 1088 (recounting aptly the integral
nature of meaningful opportunities for attorney fee recoveries as the engines that
drive—and make possible—lawsuits by private individuals to enforce rights under
federal antidiscrimination law); see also id. (“Congress saw the need for fee-shifting
statutes based in part on evidence that the vast majority of civil rights victims could
not afford representation, and that private attorneys were refusing to take civil
rights cases because of the limited potential for compensation. Congress explicitly
noted that civil rights enforcement ‘depend[s] heavily upon private enforcement,’
and that ‘fee awards’ are essential ‘if private citizens are to have a meaningful
opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws
contain.’ ” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
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Even with the recent amendments to Title VII, the expected
judgment in an employment discrimination case, especially one
brought by an hourly-wage worker, will rarely be large enough
to repay a substantial investment in the development of
evidence at the summary judgment stage, which is to say before
the case even gets to trial. And on the other hand employers
have incentives to invest heavily in the defense of these cases,
in order to deter the bringing of them. The asymmetry puts the
plaintiff at a disadvantage, as this case illustrates. There is no
basis for confidence that the defendant did not discriminate
against [the plaintiff] on account of his race and age; it is simply
that [the plaintiff] has not presented enough evidence, perhaps
because he could not afford to present more, to withstand the
company’s motion.55

What is, perhaps, even more troubling than the
acknowledgement of the federal courts’ inability to ease the
employee’s burden without depriving the employer of, what are
viewed as, procedural rights conferred upon him by settled law,56
however, is Judge Posner’s subtle but critical view of the trial
judge’s role in ruling on an employer’s summary judgment
motion in an EDL case:
We must remember that a canonical formulation of the test for
whether to grant summary judgment is whether, if the record at
trial were identical to the record compiled in the summary
judgment proceedings, the movant would be entitled to a
directed verdict because no reasonable jury would bring in a
verdict for the opposing party.57
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55
Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70–71 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted) (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974)).
56
Id. at 71.
57
Id. at 70 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
58
District Judge Larry Alan Burns candidly acknowledged his error in having
granted summary judgment in a case that the Ninth Circuit reversed and sent back
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That viewpoint launched more opinions granting employers’
summary judgment motions than Helen’s face launched ships. It
says that federal judges know better than juries what
discrimination is, and where it is to be found, simply from
reading a paper record, than the judges might know if they
informed themselves—with or without a sitting jury, from the
testimonies of real people in the crucible of a trial. At least some
federal judges—from hard-earned courtroom experience—have
learned better.58
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IV
The saga of Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.59 epitomizes the attitude
that federal judges know better than juries what discrimination
is and where it is to be found. What is interesting in this case is
the lengths that the federal judiciary went to nullify a jury’s
determination that an employer had racially discriminated
against two plaintiffs and that the employer as a consequence
should pay them compensatory and punitive damages.60 It is also
significant that twelve of the fourteen opinions in the case
rendered between 2004 and 2014 were unpublished. That
practice hides the courts’ actions from the general public. It
makes the law accessible only to those who are either more
sophisticated in tracking down unpublished slip opinions or to
those with sufficient means to retain lawyers who can afford
subscriptions to proprietary online search engines.61
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to him for trial—a trial whose outcome made him eat his own words, candidly and
forthrightly:
This case went to trial and [the defendant] lost—badly. The jury awarded
[the plaintiff] $296,252 in economic damages, $850,000 in non-economic
damages, and $3.5 million in punitive damages. Now, with $4,646,252 on
the line, [the defendant] has filed a motion for a new trial that tries to
blame its loss on legal missteps by the Court, improper statements by [the
plaintiff’s] counsel, and misconduct by the jury, rather than the actual
testimony and arguments the jury heard. The motion is DENIED. The
Court’s only error in this case, apparently, was giving [the defendant] false
hope that [the plaintiff] had no case by initially entering summary
judgment in its favor, a ruling that in retrospect was obviously mistaken.
Steffens v. Regus Grp., PLC, No. 08cv1494-LAB (BLM), 2013 WL 4499112, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013) (denying employer’s Rule 59 motion). Judge Burns was
referring to the employer’s motion for summary judgment that he had granted in an
opinion, Steffens v. Regus Grp., PLC, No. 08cv1494-LAB (BLM), 2011 WL 666906
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011), which a Ninth Circuit panel consisting of Judges B.
Fletcher, Wardlaw, and Bybee reversed in a memorandum opinion and remanded for
a jury trial. Steffens v. Regus Grp., PLC, 485 F. App’x 187, 189 (9th Cir. 2012). The
June 5, 2012 oral argument at the Ninth Circuit is instructive. See Oral Argument,
Steffens, 485 F. App’x 187 (No. 11-55379), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
media/view.php?pk_id=0000009229.
59
129 F. App’x 529 (11th Cir. 2005).
60
Id. at 534–35, 537.
61
The case against the use of unpublished opinions is very well established. See
Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or
Does the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995); see also Richard B. Cappalli, The
Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755
(2003); Deborah J. Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001);
Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the
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A
The case was filed in 1996 after plaintiffs, Anthony Ash and
John Hithon, African Americans who were superintendents at
Tyson’s Gadsen, Alabama poultry plant, applied for two shift
manager positions at the Gadsen plant but were passed over in
favor of two white employees in the summer of 1995.62
Proceeding under Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
plaintiffs—originally
part
of
a
larger
group
of
plaintiffs—survived eight years of proceedings, including
summary judgment motions filed against them, to finally reach a
jury in 2004, which promptly awarded them reach a verdict “of
compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000.00, and
punitive damages in the amount of $1,500,000.00.”63 The district
court just as promptly snatched away those verdicts from the
plaintiffs.64 In ruling on Tyson’s postverdict motion for judgment
as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(b), the U.S. magistrate judge in that case effectively
reweighed the evidence from his view of the world—not from the
jury’s. For example, the magistrate concluded that while there
was evidence of pretext in the employer’s defense, it just was not
pretextual enough to support an inference of racial
discrimination—regardless of whether the decision maker
followed the company’s own policy in making the decision or
whether he even was aware that there were written job
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U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004). Compare Anastasoff v. United States, 223
F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc granted & vacated on other grounds, 235
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000), with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159–62 (9th Cir.
2001). The Federal Judicial Conference promulgated Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 in 2006, which permits unrestricted citation to unpublished federal
appeals courts decisions—but pointedly “says nothing about what effect a court must
give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another
court.” FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee’s note. See generally Anne Coyle, A
Modest Reform: The New Rule 32.1 Permitting Citation to Unpublished Opinions in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2004); Scott E. Gant,
Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2006). The only thing worse, however,
than the practice of unpublished, nonprecedential opinions, is to make those
unpublished opinions precedential while still largely hidden from the general
public’s view.
62
Ash, 129 F. App’x at 531.
63
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-RRA-3257-M, 2004 WL 5138005, at
*1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2004).
64
Id. at *9.
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qualifications for the position.65 The magistrate judge then
proceeded to pick apart each piece of probative evidence in
isolation.
About the use of the term “boy” by the white decision maker
to refer to each of the plaintiffs, the magistrate judge decided
that—as a matter of law—no reasonable jury could find that the
moniker had racial overtones.66 Yet, a duly empanelled and
properly instructed federal court jury had found precisely that.
About Hithon’s contention—that the jury obviously had
shared—that his qualifications were better than the white
employees whom the decision maker actually promoted, the
magistrate judge said that “even if it could be found that Hithon
was more qualified than [both of the white employees], the
disparity would not be so great as to allow a finding of
discrimination based on the difference.”67 How in the world, one
might legitimately wonder, could a judge in the Rule 50 context
purport to reweigh evidence? The magistrate judge did not have
to look far to find a tool fitted to his task. In an earlier decision,68
a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit had—to the great misfortune for civil rights enforcement
across a broad swath of the old confederacy—latched on to some
profoundly unfortunate language from an opinion issued by the
court with jurisdiction over the other broad swath of the old
confederacy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.69 The test is one so antithetical to both the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the 1991 Civil Rights Act almost to beggar belief:

C M
Y K
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Id.
Id. at *6–7. The magistrate judge’s rationalization has to be read to be
believed:
The plaintiffs also point to the testimony that on one occasion [the
supervisor] called Hithon “boy,” and on two occasions he called Ash “boy.”
In a production meeting, [the supervisor] said “Hey, boy” as Hithon was
walking through the door. In the cafeteria, Hatley said to Ash, “Boy, you
think you’ve got enough starch in those jeans?” Ash’s wife told [Ash’s
supervisor] that her husband was not a boy, and [the supervisor] laughed.
Neither Ash nor Hithon complained about the statements. Even if [the
supervisor] made these statements, it cannot be found, without more, that
they were racial in nature.
Id. (citations omitted).
67
Id. at *6.
68
Id. at *5 (citing Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2000).
69
Lee, 226 F.3d at 1254 (citing Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280–81 (5th Cir. 1999)).
66
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Other circuits have more clearly articulated the evidentiary
burden a plaintiff must meet in order to prove pretext by
showing she was substantially more qualified than the person
promoted. In Deines, for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s instruction to the jury stating that “disparities in
qualifications are not enough in and of themselves to
demonstrate discriminatory intent unless those disparities are
so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the
face.” The court explained that the phrase “jump off the page
and slap [you] in the face” . . . should be understood to mean
that disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and
significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of
impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected
over the plaintiff for the job in question. This evidentiary
standard does not alter the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden to
prove the fact of intentional discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence. Instead, the standard only describes the
character of this particular type of evidence that will be
probative of that ultimate fact.70
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70
Ash, 2004 WL 5138005, at *5 (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Lee, 226 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Deines, 164 F.3d at 280–81)).
71
Deines, 164 F.3d at 281.
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What an incredibly bitter irony—so far had the federal
courts strayed from the prize, that is, elimination of
discrimination in employment—that three different courts and
seven different judges reached the conclusion that Title VII
plaintiffs contending they were more qualified than the employee
selected for promotion had to prove not only that their
qualifications were superior—but that they were a quantum leap
so obviously superior that no reasonable person on the face of the
earth could disagree with plaintiffs’ contentions.
This is
certainly the closest I have ever seen a court in a civil case come
to requiring a plaintiff to prove his claim using the criminal law
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than the
applicable preponderance of the evidence standard. Only an
imperious federal court could believe that by declaring “[t]his
evidentiary standard does not alter” the burden of proof but
merely “describes the character of” the evidence, that it had
somehow justified the perversion of law it had worked.71 Those
with long memories might be forgiven for thinking of the Roman
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emperor who declared his horse a “Consul of Rome”72 and
expected his subjects to believe it simply because he had uttered
it.73
Perhaps the crowing ingloriousness of this inglorious opinion
was the magistrate judge’s blithe footnote: “Any other assertion
of discrimination not commented on is no more probative of
discrimination than the assertions discussed.”74 While the jurors
were no doubt thanked for their service at the end of the trial,
what would they conclude were they to read that the magistrate
judge considered them either imbeciles or so biased themselves
that they could not see straight?
B
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72
SUETONIUS I, at 418, 499 (J.C. Rolfe trans., Loeb Classical Library 1998)
(1913).
73
See E. Freeman, Camus, Suetonius, and the Caligula Myth, 24 SYMP.: Q.J.
MODERN LITERATURES 230, 233 (1970).
74
Ash, 2004 WL 5138005, at *9 n.8.
75
See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); ANNE EMANUEL, ELBERT
PARR TUTTLE: CHIEF JURIST OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011).
76
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
77
Id. (alterations in original).
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Ash and Hithon deserved better treatment at the hands of
the court of appeals in Atlanta, which at one time had been a
bulwark of civil rights.75 The Eleventh Circuit panel decreed that
as a matter of law, no reasonable juror could rely on the
testimony about the supervisor’s use of the word “boy” in
referring to either of the plaintiffs as evidence of discrimination:
“While the use of ‘boy’ when modified by a racial classification
like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is evidence of discriminatory intent . . . the
use of ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”76
Further, “[i]n a failure to promote case,” the Eleventh Circuit
panel decreed not only that “a plaintiff cannot prove pretext by
simply showing that []he was better qualified than the individual
who received the position that []he wanted,” but also that
“[p]retext can be established through comparing qualifications
only when ‘the disparity in qualifications is so apparent as
virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.’ ”77 The
panel emphasized the nearly metaphysical distinction that “an
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employee’s showing that the employer hired a less qualified
candidate is probative of whether the employer’s reason is
pretextual, but not proof of pretext.”78
These rulings destroyed Ash’s case and much of Hithon’s.
The court also threw out both the compensatory and punitive
damages verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs. Only a sliver of
Hithon’s case remained “because he demonstrated that [his
supervisor] interviewed him after [the supervisor] had already
hired King, indicating that [the supervisor’s] stated reasons for
rejecting Hithon—his lack of a college degree, his position as a
manager at a financially troubled plant, and his lack of
experience outside of the Gadsen plant—were pretextual.”79
However, the panel ruled that there would have to be a new trial
on damages, because neither plaintiff’s evidence, in their secondguessing view, was “insubstantial” and did not, as a matter of
law, prove either emotional distress or humiliation from
discrimination or that the employer “knew [it] was violating
federal law” when it discriminated against Hithon.80
C

78
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Id.
Id. at 534.
80
Id. at 536.
81
See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Appellate Lawyer of the Week: Eric Schnapper,
University of Washington Law School, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 27, 2010), available at LEXIS;
see also Eric Schnapper, U. WASH. SCH. L., http://www.law.washington.edu/
directory/profile.aspx?ID=155 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016); Eric Schnapper, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/advocates/eric_schnapper (last visited Jan. 18, 2016); UW
School of Law, Eric Schnapper, Betts Patterson Mines Professor of Law Installation,
YOUTUBE, (Nov. 28, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mygmi9qTwrc.
82
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 544 (2006)
(No. 05-379), 2005 WL 2341981, at *10.
79
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Rather than simply returning to the district court to re-try
Hithon’s case, counsel for Ash and Hithon filed a petition for
certiorari with the assistance of Professor Eric Schnapper.81 The
petition shone a stark light on the pernicious effects of the law
that the Eleventh Circuit panel had blithely recited in its
unpublished opinion. First, the petition assailed the slap-you-inthe-face standard, observing that “[t]his vivid metaphor is
actually the legal standard applied in more than a hundred lower
court decisions . . . [and] is a standard which has proven virtually
impossible to meet.”82 In fact, this judicial gloss on Title
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VII—even as it was amended by § 703(m) of the 1991
CRA—proved almost as antithetical to its enforcement as the
segregationists who assailed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the
debates preceding its eventual passage:
The “slap in the face” standard, avowedly stringent in theory, is
fatal in practice. In the ten Eleventh Circuit decisions applying
this standard, no plaintiff ever succeeded in making the
requisite showing. The court of appeals has applied that
standard both to direct summary judgment for defendants and,
as here, to overturn jury verdicts. Equally striking is the
pattern of decisions among district court decisions in the
Eleventh Circuit. Since that circuit adopted the “slap in the
face” standard in 2000, it has been applied in 34 district court
decisions reproduced in Westlaw. In every one of them the
district (or magistrate) judge held that the plaintiff had failed to
show that the disparities in qualifications were so great that
they jumped off the page and slapped one (i.e. the judge) in the
face.83

About the racial epithet, the petition recited the history of
“one of the most infamous racial epithets that continues from the
era of Jim Crow: addressing an adult African-American man as
‘boy,’ ” infamous as a “form of verbal abuse [having] its origins in
the slave era.”84 Rightfully, the petition observed:

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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83
Id. at *11–12 (footnotes omitted); see also Clark v. Alfa Ins. Co., No. Civ. A.
00–AR–3296–S, 2002 WL 32366291, at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 28, 2002) (“[T]his court’s
face does not feel slapped.”). Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit, another “face-slap”
circuit, courts “ha[d] applied this standard to direct summary judgment for
defendants, to affirm a directed verdict for defendant, to reverse as clearly erroneous
trial judge findings of discrimination, and to overturn jury verdicts of
discrimination,” with the results that (1) “[n]o Fifth Circuit panel has ever found
that this standard was met” and (2) “[i]n the last six years [that is, 1999–2005],
among district court decisions in the Fifth Circuit available on Westlaw, the ‘slap in
the face’/‘cry out’ standard has been applied in 40 cases; in all but one case the
district (or magistrate) judge held that the plaintiff's evidence did not meet that
standard.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ash, 546 U.S. 544 (No. 05-379), 2005 WL
2341981, at *13–15 (footnotes omitted).
84
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ash, 546 U.S. 544 (No. 05-379), 2005 WL
2341981, at *22.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 260 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

3/24/16 2:17 PM

FINAL_VANDETTA.DOC

908

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:883

In the teeth of the long and sordid use of this racial epithet, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case has held
that, when a white person addresses an adult African-American
as “boy” (rather than “black boy”) “the use of ‘boy’ alone is not
evidence of racial discrimination.”85

Succinctly, the petition concluded, “That holding is not merely
wrong; it can fairly be characterized as astounding.”86
The Supreme Court was astounded enough to grant the
petition, and eschewing even an argument, reversed the
Eleventh Circuit in a per curiam rebuke. The per curiam Court
gave short shrift to the “face-slap” standard, ruling that “[t]he
visual image of words jumping off the page to slap you
(presumably a court) in the face is unhelpful and imprecise as an
elaboration of the standard for inferring pretext from superior
qualifications.”87 It gave even less credence to the Eleventh
Circuit’s bizarre holding on the evidentiary significance of
management calling African-American men “boy,” taking the
time to point out the following to the lower courts:
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be
evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term,
standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may
depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of
voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as the Court of
Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in
all instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the
court’s decision is erroneous.88

85
86

88
89

04/08/2016 13:04:55

87

Id. at *24.
Id. at *25.
Ash, 546 U.S. at 457.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 458.
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The per curiam Court therefore simultaneously granted
certiorari, vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, and
remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit to “determine in the
first instance whether the two aspects of its decision here
determined to have been mistaken were essential to its
holding.”89
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D
One might think that the Eleventh Circuit panel would have
been chastened by this rebuke. But skeptics worried. In the
words of Professor Leon Friedman at Hofstra, “The question on
remand [was]: [I]s the [Eleventh Circuit] going to find some
other reason for taking away the jury verdict?”90
And find another reason for taking away the jury verdict
they did. The Eleventh Circuit’s panel of the Alabama duo,
Judges Dubina and Carnes, and Judge Marcus from Florida,
gave no ground. Taking the case up again after remand from the
Supreme Court, the panel, again speaking per curiam, held fast
to rejecting any legal significance to testimony that the plant
manager called the plaintiffs “boy”:
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90
Leon Friedman, Other Civil Rights Decisions in the October 2005 Term: Title
VII, IDEA, and Section 1981, 22 TOURO L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2007).
91
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2006). It is
interesting that the panel retroactively applied to the trial record the factors just
articulated by the Supreme Court, rather than instead choosing to remand the case
for retrial under that test, which would have allowed all parties the opportunity to
frame their cases accordingly. The panel’s decision is reflective of a serious
misconception on the part of judges in evaluating biased remarks for, as Professor
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After reviewing the record, we conclude once again that the use
of “boy” by [the supervisor] was not sufficient, either alone or
with the other evidence, to provide a basis for a jury reasonably
to find that Tyson’s stated reasons for not promoting the
plaintiffs was racial discrimination.
The usages were
conversational and as found by the district court were nonracial in context. But even if somehow construed as racial, we
conclude that the comments were ambiguous stray remarks not
uttered in the context of the decisions at issue and are not
sufficient circumstantial evidence of bias to provide a
reasonable basis for a finding of racial discrimination in the
denial of the promotions. The lack of a modifier in the context
of the use of the word “boy” in this case was not essential to the
finding that it was not used racially, or in such a context as to
evidence racial bias, in the decisions at issue, even if “boy” is
considered to have general racial implications. The statements
were remote in time to the employment decision, totally
unrelated to the promotions at issue, and showed no indication
of general racial bias in the decision making process at the
plant or by [the supervisor]. Moreover, there is nothing in the
record about the remaining factors to support an inference of
racial animus in the use of the term “boy.”91
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Tristin Greene has explained, “[c]ourts applying Title VII tend to focus their inquiry
on the state of mind of an identified decisionmaker or decisionmakers at the moment
in time that a specific employment decision was made,” and thus, by “[v]iewing facts
through this narrow lens, courts close emotion experienced in day-to-day interaction
(racial or otherwise) out of antidiscrimination discourse.” Tristin K. Green, Racial
Emotion in the Workplace, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 983 (2013). Continuing the
thought, Professor Green observes:
The stray remarks doctrine is used regularly by courts in cases involving
racial language or language reflecting racial bias, like Ash v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., but the same narrow inquiry closes out the many more interracial
relations that do not involve racial language. The narrow focus on state of
mind at a discrete moment in time ignores the reality that most
employment decisions are based on working relationships that are ongoing
and have developed over time.
Moreover, the stray remarks doctrine is but one example of a broader
tendency on the part of courts to isolate specific employment decisions from
the web of workplace relationships and the contexts in which those
relationships and employment decisions arise. Even if commentators (and
courts) agree in theory that disparate treatment law requires only a
showing that the adverse employment action was taken “because of”
membership in a protected group and not a showing of purpose or conscious
motivation on the part of a specific decisionmaker, the prevailing
conception of discrimination as involving a decision at a precise moment in
time tends to close racial emotion out of antidiscrimination concern.
Id. at 986–87 (footnotes omitted). Courts would do well to heed Professor Green’s
proposal for reconceptualizing such expressions of racial emotion in the workplace as
evidence highly relevant to the jury’s role in assessing discrimination claims from a
holistic perspective—what the author would describe as the “a motivating factor”
perspective intended by § 703(m) of the 1991 CRA—rather than from the sterile and
intellectually vacuous perspective of the “direct evidence of the decision maker’s
intent” standard:
There are a number of ways in which the law can better see and address
racial emotion as a source of discrimination in the workplace. . . . The
overarching goal is conceptual. Judges, lawyers, members of the media, and
laypeople can better conceptualize discrimination as a problem not just of
biases that operate in the minds of specific, identifiable decisionmakers at
discrete moments in time, but as also a problem of relations that are
capable of being derailed by negative racial emotions as well as cognitive
biases. Acknowledging that relations can be a root of discrimination and
group-based disadvantage is an important first step in addressing racial
emotion and opening opportunities for developing positive racial emotion in
the workplace. Acknowledging racial emotion, and not just cognitive biases,
as a source of disadvantage and inequality within those relations is the
next step.
Following from this conceptual shift, courts should resist the temptation to
assume (or presume) that an acrimonious workplace relationship is solely
personal, and therefore nonracial. Racial emotion is personal and racial. It
is experienced by people in interracial interaction and can result in
relationships that exhibit emotionally laden, hostile behavior. Absent
evidence that an acrimonious or otherwise emotionally laden relationship is
nonracial, such as evidence that hostility developed after a specific,
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As for the “face-slap” test, the panel acknowledged that “the
Supreme Court instructed that the visual image of words
‘jumping off the page to slap you in the face’ was unhelpful and
imprecise as an elaboration of the standard for inferring pretext
from superior qualifications” and instead reached the same result
under a considerably less vivid but equally opaque test:
“[D]isparities in qualifications must be of such weight and
significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of
impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected
over the plaintiff for the job in question.”92
Petitions for
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nonracial incident, courts should permit an inference of discrimination to
follow from animosity in interracial relations.
Id. at 1008–09 (footnote omitted). As an example particularly pertinent to cases such
as Ash v. Tyson, Professor Green explains:
The overarching conceptual shift described above would nonetheless be
aided by a simple categorical recognition of the relational behaviors that
are most likely to trigger negative racial emotion, acrimonious
relationships, and workplace inequality. These are the behaviors that are
most disastrous to interracial relationships. I call this category of behavior
“racial assault.” . . . What is behavior of racial assault? Behavior of racial
assault should be defined legally as behavior that is expressively
subordinating. Use of racially subordinating language, such as . . . [the
stand-alone pejorative phrase] “boy” [that the plant manager used in Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc.] to refer to blacks, statements reflecting normative and/or
descriptive race-based stereotypes about a person’s ability to do a job, such
as “black people should stay in their place” or “that's a lot of money for a
black to count,” and other behavioral expressions of subordination and
dominance, such as construction or display of nooses, would all be
considered behaviors of racial assault. The legal inquiry would turn not on
state of mind of the person exhibiting behavior of racial assault, but on the
message of subordination that it sends and the racial emotion that is likely
to result. The law should treat racial assault behavior as presumptively
discriminatory and as constituting a hostile work environment. Behaviors
of racial assault are presumptively racial and the emotion experienced by
racial minorities subjected to these behaviors is presumptively reasonable,
as a matter of policy as much as a matter of fact. Courts should not be
permitted to substitute their own judgment about what the actor
“intended” for a legal presumption in these cases. Further, the law should
presume that adverse employment decisions made by someone who has
exhibited racial assault behavior as to any individuals against whom the
behavior was directed were motivated at least in part by race. The
presumption should apply no matter how remote in time from the decision
at issue the behavior was exhibited. Only if the employer can show that it
would have made the same decision anyway should the relief available to
the plaintiff be limited.
Id. at 1010–11 (footnotes omitted).
92
Ash, 190 F. App’x at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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rehearing and rehearing en banc were promptly denied in short
order93 followed by a denial of a second certiorari petition in early
2007.94
E
In 2008, Mr. Hithon’s case was retried to a jury, “where the
jury again found discrimination and awarded damages for back
pay in the amount of $35,000.00, damages for mental anguish in
the amount of $300,000.00, and punitive damages in the amount
of $1,000,000.00.”95 Tyson filed another Rule 50(b) motion, which
the district court granted in part “on the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that [the
supervisor’s] actions warranting punitive damages could be
imputed to Tyson,” and thus the district court set aside the
punitive damages award in its entirety.96 “All other Rule 50(b)
relief requested by the defendant” was denied.97

93

Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 213 F. App’x 973 (11th Cir. 2006).
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 549 U.S. 1181 (2007).
95
Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 96-RRA-3257-M, 2008 WL 4921515, at *1
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2008).
96
Id. at *10. On the Rule 50(b) motion, the district court concluded that, inter
alia, “it is clear from the evidence that Tyson provided federal anti-discrimination
law training to its employees, including [the supervisor]” and that thus, “the
evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that [the supervisor’s] actions were
malicious or recklessly indifferent to the plaintiff's known federally protected
rights.” Id. at *6. However, the district court bought Tyson’s arguments: (1) [T]he
decision maker, “Hatley, a plant manager with Tyson, was not high enough up the
corporate ladder to impute his malicious, recklessly indifferent, or otherwise
egregious acts to it,” id. at *7; (2) “Tyson’s higher management was never informed
of Hatley’s discriminatory acts or that they approved of his behavior in any way” and
thus, “Hatley’s actions, whether or not amounting to actual malice or reckless
indifference, cannot be imputed to Tyson,” id. at *9; and (3) “Tyson had implemented
several policies to prevent discrimination in promotion and hiring decisions, as
previously set out” and thus, “Hatley’s actions in violation of Tyson’s discrimination
policies cannot be imputed to the employer in order to impose punitive damages,” id.
at *10. The district court purported to apply the rulings of the Supreme Court in
Kolstad v. American Dental Association that (1) punitive damages could be imposed
in Title VII action without a “showing of egregious or outrageous discrimination
independent of the employer’s state of mind;” (2) “employer must at least
discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to
be liable in punitive damages;” and (3) “employer may not be vicariously liable for
the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents,” for purposes of
imposing punitive damages, “where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s
‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’ ” 527 U.S. 526, 535–36, 545 (1999).
97
Hithon, 2008 WL 4921515, at *10. That included Tyson’s arguments
“contest[ing] the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of discrimination
94
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[and] the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of compensatory damages.”
Id at *1.
98
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 392 F. App’x 817, 821 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
99
Id. at 818.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 833.
103
Id. at 819–33.
104
Id. at 833 (Dowd, J., dissenting). The panel’s decision drew coverage from
New York Times Legal Reporter Adam Liptak. See Adam Liptak, To Juries,
Discrimination; to Judges, Conversation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at A16.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 263 Side A

Cross-appeals
ensued,
and—surprise,
surprise—the
appellate court once again reversed the verdict in favor of
Hithon, once more concluding that no reasonable jury could
possibly have found in Hithon’s favor.98 But the Eleventh Circuit
panel for this fourth round had changed.99 Only Judge Carnes
remained from the original panel that heard the first three
appeals.100 In this fourth panel, he was joined by Circuit Judge
Pryor as well as District Judge David Dowd, sitting by
designation.101 And while the opinion was again offered as per
curiam, only Judges Carnes and Pryor joined it. Quite unusually
for an opinion that a panel designates as “unpublished,” this
opinion featured a dissent—by Senior District Judge David D.
Dowd, Jr., of the Northern District of Ohio. Although the
standard of deferential jury review was recited—“[v]iewing the
evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to Hithon”102—the
per curiam opinion dissected the trial record to such an extent
that not only was this the longest opinion in the case to date, it
also appeared to be a de novo reweighing of each scrap of
evidence,103 almost as if the judges were lecturing the jury on just
how “inept” they were in discharging their duties—just as “inept”
as the first jury whose verdict the Eleventh Circuit reversed in
2005.
This time, however, the third judge did not buy into the
injudicious contempt for the jury verdicts displayed in the
opinion of the other two jurists. Judge Dowd was short and
sweet: “I respectfully dissent. Two juries have found the issues
in favor of the plaintiff Hithon and granted both compensatory
and punitive damages. In my view, the record supports an
affirmance of the second jury verdict as to compensatory
damages.”104 Judge Dowd also opined that “the record also
supports a conclusion that a punitive damages award is
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justified,” but the record shows, he said, that “the amount of
punitive damages awarded by the jury is excessive.”105 Judge
Dowd therefore favored an affirmance of everything except the
punitive damages verdict and proposed that there should be “a
new trial on punitive damages, unless the plaintiff accepts a
remittitur.”106
F
And here the plot thickens. Not since Owen J. Roberts
decided that the legislative branch of government really was
ascendant over the judiciary after all in the famous “switch in
time saved nine”107 had a court done such a starling about-face.108
In the face of a petition for rehearing—both panel and
en banc—the panel granted the petition for rehearing and issued
an opinion,109 although issued under Judge Carnes’s name,110
that largely followed the path limned by Judge Dowd in his
previous dissent, repudiating—without expressly acknowledging
the repudiation—the utter misapplication of the standard of
reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence.111
Applying the correct standards—that is, that “[w]e will reverse
105

Ash, 392 F. App’x at 833.
Id. Let anyone mistake this as the handiwork of a flaming liberal, Judge
Dowd, born in 1929, is a former Republican judge of the Ohio Supreme Court and
was nominated for the federal district court by Ronald Reagan in 1982. See David
Dudley Dowd Jr., SUP. CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS., http://www.supremecourt.oh
io.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/dowd.asp (last visited July 28, 2015). Judge Dowd
retired from the federal bench in July 2014. See Ed Meyer, Retiring Federal Judge
David D. Dowd Jr. Reflects on Long Career on Bench, AKRON BEACON J., (July 12,
2014, 6:21 PM), http://www.ohio.com/news/local/retiring-federal-judge-david-d-dowdjr-reflects-on-long-career-on-bench-1.503974.
107
See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, Charles Evans Hughes: The Center Holds,
83 N.C. L. REV. 1187, 1198–1201 & n.92 (2005).
108
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision once again drew national attention from legal
reporter Adam Liptak who did not hesitate to apply the term “about-face” to this last
word from the federal court of appeals in Atlanta. See Adam Liptak, A Judicial
About-Face, Grudging but Rare, in a Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, at A16.
Mr. Liptak observed, “The new decision followed unflattering news coverage of the
earlier one and might have been prompted by the possibility of a rebuke from the
full 11th Circuit.” Id. The article quoted a less generous assessment by attorney
Stephen Bright of the Southern Center for Human Rights: “He said the case
demonstrated ‘how judges manipulate facts and law to make a case come out the
way they want it to’ ” and that “[t]he new opinion flatly contradicts the first one in
several places.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
109
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2011).
110
Id. at 886.
111
Id. at 892.
106
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only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of
one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a
contrary verdict,” and that “[w]e view all the evidence and draw
all inferences from it in the light most favorable to Hithon
because he is the nonmoving party”—correctly, the court upheld
every aspect of the jury verdict on discrimination and
compensatory damages112 and rejected specious arguments by the
employer running the gamut from “law of the case”113 to
challenges to various evidentiary rulings at trial that favored
Hithon.114
The about-face showed most dramatically in three different
aspects of the fifth Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. opinion. First, the
panel’s emphasis in reviewing whether the evidence sustained
the jury’s verdict on pretext was 180 degrees from its earlier,
dismissive attitude; the panel much more appropriately framed
the standard:
When pretext is the issue, and judgment as a matter of law to
the defendant is under consideration, we “must evaluate
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses,
implausibilities,
inconsistencies,
incoherencies,
or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy
of credence.”115

Second, the panel found enlightenment in applying the Supreme
Court’s standard to the evidence that the decision maker had
referred to Mr. Hithon and Mr. Ash as “boy”:

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

112
Id. at 890–900 (quoting Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,
1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113
Id. at 891–92.
114
Id. at 898.
115
Id. at 892 (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1997).
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In our now-vacated Ash IV opinion, we concluded that the
evidence about the use of the word “boy” that was presented at
the second trial “was not ‘new and substantially different’
enough for us to revisit the conclusion of law made in our Ash
III decision after the Supreme Court’s remand.” [B]ut we now
reach a different conclusion. Some new and substantially
different evidence about Hatley’s use of the word “boy” was
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presented at the second trial and that evidence cannot be
considered in isolation.
We instead must consider it in
combination with all of the other evidence.116

Third, the panel viewed the evidence cumulatively—rather
than in the divide-and-conquer, seriatim manner that they had
in all of the earlier, per curiam decisions117—and reached an
entirely different conclusion than Judges Carnes and Pryor had
reached previously:

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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116
Id. at 897 (citations omitted) (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 392 F. App’x
817, 833 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Ash, 664 F.3d at 892 n.4). On the contextual
meaning of the word “boy” in cases such as Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Debo P.
Adegbile and John Payton of the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund,
submitted an amicus brief in the case. See Amici Curiae Brief in Support of PlaintiffAppellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Civil Rights Leaders et al., Hithon v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 144 F. App’x 795 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 08-16135-BB). The amici
were a roster of some of the most venerable figures in the fight against racial
discrimination:
Hon. U.W. Clemon, Alabama’s first African-American federal judge; Ms.
Dorothy Cotton, the Education Director for the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) (1960–68); Rev. Robert S. Graetz, Jr., a
leader of the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Dr. Bernard LaFayette, Jr., a
leader in the Civil Rights Movement; Rev. Joseph E. Lowery, a founder and
former president of the SCLC; Mrs. Amelia Boynton Robinson, Selma civil
rights activist; Hon. Solomon Seay, Jr., eminent Alabama civil rights
attorney; Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth, civil rights pioneer and a founder of
SCLC; Rev. C.T. Vivian, Executive Staff for the SCLC; Dr. Wyatt Tee
Walker, former Chief of Staff to Dr. King; the Hon. Andrew Young, former
Executive Director of the SCLC, Mayor of Atlanta, Congressman, and
Ambassador to the United Nations.
Id. at 1–2. The amici described their interest in the case in memorable terms:
Amici have a profound interest in the outcome of this case and in the
preservation of the legal protections for which they have committed their
lives. Moreover, the Amici are intimately familiar with the language of
racial discrimination and its demeaning and harmful effects. They share
the view that use of the term “boy” to describe an African-American man is
deeply offensive and that its use reflects discriminatory intent.
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted). The amici zeroed in on what they aptly described as “the
panel’s misinterpretation of the ‘boy’ testimony in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F.
App’x 924 (11th Cir. 2006) . . . and in the panel’s August 17, 2010 opinion, Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 WL 3244920 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2010).” Id. at 1 n.1. It is
evident that Judges Carnes and Pryor were influenced to come around to Judge
Dowd’s view by the powerful witness borne by these illustrious men and
women—yet, Judge Carnes’s only reference to the amici in the opinion was to scold
the amici for “recount[ing] the facts incorrectly when discussing the evidence at the
second trial about the one occasion when Hatley used the word ‘boy’ in reference to
Ash and the other occasion when Hatley used the word in reference to Hithon.” Ash,
664 F.3d at 896 n.9. That footnote ends with the barb, “Although we welcome amicus
curiae briefs that are helpful, misstatements of facts are not helpful.” Id.
117
Ash, 664 F.3d at 897.
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In light of all of the evidence, we cannot say that “the facts and
inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that
reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” The
verdict could have gone either way, and it went Hithon’s way.
We cannot say that the evidence he presented at the second
trial was not sufficient to demonstrate “such weaknesses,
implausibilities,
inconsistencies,
incoherencies,
or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy
of credence.”118

G
For sixteen years, Robert Hithon waited to see any justice
done for his employer’s discrimination against him in 1995. Yet,
it took him seven appeals and two jury trials to get even a
measure of justice that would prove fleeting and no longer
subject to vacatur by a nonempathetic federal appeals court.
Few litigants have the determination—not to mention the legal
counsel—to wage that kind of battle nor can our system bear the
weight of such titanic struggles over what was a fairly
straightforward case of disparate treatment—not a putative
500,000 across-the-board attack on the disparate impact of an
employer’s policies. Justice delayed is justice denied, as the
saying goes. Nowhere is that more apparent than in this case,
which mirrors the federal courts’ indifference to § 703(m) for over

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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118
Id. at 898 (citations omitted). Judge Dowd, however, failed to persuade his
colleagues on the punitive damages issues—Judges Carnes and Pryor still insisted
that, as a matter of law, the plant manager’s actions were not attributable to the
corporation itself, and thus, Tyson escaped the award of any punitive damages. Id.
at 900–07. There is much doubt about their analysis, particularly the fact that they
cite Tyson’s adoption of antibias policies at the corporate level as evidence of good
faith to defeat malice or recklessness under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, id. at 904–05, while
the panel cited and quoted Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526,
545–46 (1999). While the critique could be the subject of a separate article, it suffices
to observe here that merely one year before Kolstad was decided, the Court in a pair
of sexual harassment cases decided that an employer’s having anti-sexual
harassment policies in place but failing to ensure that they were enforced served as
a basis for liability, rather than exoneration. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Lawyers as
Investigators: How Ellerth and Faragher Reveal a Crisis of Ethics and
Professionalism Through Trial Counsel Disqualification and Waivers of Privilege in
Workplace Harassment Cases, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 261, 263 & n.8 (2000) (discussing
the impact of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)); see also Green, supra note 91, at
1011 (“The law should treat racial assault behavior as presumptively discriminatory
and as constituting a hostile work environment.”).
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a decade after it was enacted and then for another decade after
the Supreme Court had made clearer the breadth of its
applicability. The saga of Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. thus, as I
began this Section by asserting, epitomizes the attitude that
federal judges know better than juries what discrimination is and
where it is to be found. It is precisely the same attitude that has
thwarted § 703(m) of Title VII from liberating Title VII—and, for
that matter, 42 U.S.C. § 1981—claims from the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine straightjacket.
Very revealing on this point is Judge Carnes’s belatedly
holistic description of the evidence Hithon presented at trial:

Here, had the federal courts applied the motivating factor
standard, just as the trial court in Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc.
had done in instructing its jury,120 there is no doubt that Mr.
Hithon’s path to justice would have been years earlier in arriving
at its destination—and the case of Mr. Ash, his coplaintiff, might
have gotten the proper consideration it deserved. When the
Eleventh Circuit finally candidly and correctly described the trial
record, it becomes clear that the evidence would have met the
motivating factor standard.

Ash, 664 F.3d at 897–98.
See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
120
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[W]e consider all of the evidence cumulatively, viewing it in the
light most favorable to Hithon, to determine whether it is
enough for a reasonable jury to have found that Tyson
discriminated against Hithon based on race by promoting Dade
to the shift manager position. As we have discussed, there was
enough evidence for a reasonable jury to have found pretextual
Tyson’s proffered race-neutral reason of wanting a shift
manager who had not been in management at the failing plant;
to have found that there was a written job requirement of three
to five years experience in the poultry business, which Hithon
met but Dade did not; to have found that there was also an
unwritten job requirement of experience in first and second
processing, which Hithon met but Dade did not; and to have
found that Hatley, the decision maker, used the word “boy” in a
racially demeaning way to refer to Hithon and another AfricanAmerican male employee on two occasions just before the
decision was made.119
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V
Employers, like Tyson in the Ash case, who put their
decisions into a zone of uncertainty where they have not adopted
internal process, or not followed the internal process that they
have in place, or in which they have followed process, but the
veracity of the reasons given for the action nonetheless are in
doubt should have to persuade the society in which they operate
of their motive.
At present, such cases fall on summary
judgment more often than they do not.121 The federal courts
should recognize that this incursion of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 oversteps the boundaries limned by the Seventh
Amendment and should instead equate an employer-created zone
of uncertainty with mandatory trial. This very point was
established twenty-seven years ago by the late Judge Irving R.
Kaufman, legendary and controversial circuit judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,122 in his dramatic
and riveting opening of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Donahue
v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners123:
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121
See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)
(“The growing difficulty that district judges face in scheduling civil trials, a difficulty
that is due to docket pressures in general and to the pressure of the criminal docket
in particular, makes appellate courts reluctant to reverse a grant of summary
judgment merely because a rational factfinder could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly unlikely as a practical matter because
the plaintiff's case . . . is marginal.”).
122
See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Politics and Legal Regulation in the International
Business Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV, 63–64 nn. 227–29 (2013) (discussing the appellate court career of Judge
Kaufman). The author was law clerk to Second Circuit Judge Roger J. Miner from
1987–88, and we frequently sat on panels with Judge Kaufman—who by then had
taken senior status yet still wrote widely-publicized opinions, such as Bandes v.
Harlow & Jones, Inc., notable for opening in ringing tones:
Within our nation’s borders, we have adhered to the principle that
government may not deprive its citizens of property without due process of
law and just compensation. Of course, this ideal, embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, constrains our federal and
state governments, not those of other countries. But when a foreign
sovereign, following hostilities, confiscates a defeated group’s property and
attempts to extend that taking to interests held here, a United States court
will effectuate the seizure for only the weightiest reasons.
852 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1988); see Harold H. Lubacsh, U.S. Court Rejects a
Sandinista Suit over Assets, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/
1988/07/20/world/us-court-rejects-a-sandinista-suit-over-assets.html.
123
834 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1987). Donahue was one of the cases argued before and
decided by a panel including Judge Miner and Senior Judge Kaufman during the
time of my clerkship with Judge Miner. See supra note 122.
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The fundamental obligation of the federal courts is to adjudicate
disputes. Not all controversies present triable issues, however,
and the courts have a responsibility to vigilantly weed out those
cases that do not merit further judicial attention.
The
procedural tool of summary judgment enables courts to
terminate meritless claims, but this potent instrument must be
used with the precision of a scalpel. The courts must take care
not to abort a genuine factual dispute prematurely and thus
deprive a litigant of his day in court.124

Judge Kaufman elaborated on the theme of using summary
judgment as a precision instrument to be wielded with great
attention, rather than as a stamping machine in an
industrialized legal process, employing a helpful metaphor, in
sharp contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
decision:
A summary judgment motion presents a judge with an arduous
task, and this appellant’s aggressive behavior has not made our
undertaking any easier.
The Roman philosopher Plautus
warned us that there is no smoke without fire but, if this were
always true, federal courts would not be able to distinguish
between meritless and meritorious suits.
Here, however,
Plautus’s advice is most appropriate. Although Donahue’s
complaint raises mostly smoke, it also reveals a flame that
should have precluded summary judgment against him.125

Although the basic principles for granting summary judgment
are well-settled, the frequency of cases in which it is granted
improvidently persuades us that these tenets bear repetition.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides, in part, that summary judgment
shall be rendered only when a review of the entire record
demonstrates “that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact.” The burden falls on the moving party to establish that no
relevant facts are in dispute. Moreover, in determining whether
a genuine issue has been raised, a court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the

125
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Well aware of the potential mischief that the Celotex trilogy
was beginning to work, Judge Kaufman restated the law in a way
that should put federal district judges on guard, particularly in
“motive” cases such as those under our federal Employment
Discrimination Law (“EDL”):

Donahue, 834 F.2d at 55.
Id. at 57.
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moving party. Therefore, not only must there be no genuine
issue as to the evidentiary facts, but there must also be no
controversy regarding the inferences to be drawn from them.126

Judge Kaufman zeroed in on the employer’s role in creating
a zone of uncertainty around its decisions affecting the plaintiff’s
employment:
[W]e note the words of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on
a similar dispute: [“]We regret that this trivial episode, arising
from the daily grist of personnel management matters at [an
employer], has been elevated to the status of a ‘federal case.’
But it seems to us that the management . . . is most at fault in
what
appears
to
be
a
ponderously
inappropriate
reaction . . . .[”]127
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126
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of
Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Olean, 667 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1981); Heyman v.
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319–20 (2d Cir. 1975)).
127
Id. at 59 (omissions in original) (quoting Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623 F.2d 35, 41
(7th Cir. 1980)).
128
Id. at 57.
129
See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633–34 (1991);
Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010).
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It is precisely those cases in which the employer’s actions
and words have created a zone of uncertainty that federal
judges—admonished by the words of both Judge Posner and the
late Judge Kaufman—must stay the hand of summary judgment
and recognize that there is, indeed, ipso facto, a “controversy
regarding the inferences to be drawn”128 from the facts,
regardless of whether the facts themselves are undisputed. By
this simple—yet earth-shaking—difference in perspective, the
courts can compensate for their insularity and mediate the effect
of what the federal courts have done to § 703(m) despite the clear
and logically inescapable implications of Costa. Even that is not
a perfect solution, of course, because our jury pools and jury
selection can be rife with inequalities.129 However, it is a better
solution than having cases dismissed under the formalistic
rituals of Celotex and McDonnell Douglas.
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VI
Will the courts find their way back to Judge Kaufman’s
sensible understanding of the proper role of summary judgment
in Employment Discrimination Law (“EDL”) cases? Even if they
do, will it help much if they continue to misapply § 703(m)?
Short of a politically unlikely statutory amendment telling them
to do so—and even then, old habits die hard—it seems that those
who would see a renaissance of the idea of robust EDL
enforcement must take the task in additional directions, after
half of a century, to make Title VII work—and work not just for
the employers and labor organizations in the United States but
for the individual worker as well. I do not have the temerity to
assert that I have formulated the grand strategy to bring this
about. I conclude this Essay simply by putting forth some of my
thinking on the subject in hopes of contributing to—even if only
by provoking—additional discourse that may prove helpful to
realizing Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream in the twenty-first
century, especially for those growing up, like my twelve-year-old
son, Levi, in the millennial generation.130
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130
See, e.g., Fulfilling Dr. King’s Dream: A Charge From Alumna Heather
McGhee, MILTON ACADEMY, (Jan. 1, 2012), http://auth.milton.common
spotcloud.com/news/12-1_mlk_speaker.cfm. In this stirring message, Ms. McGhee,
who went on from her Milton graduation in 1997 to earn a Bachelor of Arts degree in
American Studies from Yale University and a Juris Doctor from the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law, proclaimed:
We are the children of Dr. King’s dream, because we are the most diverse
generation in American history. We are the generation charged with
fulfilling that dream. I believe that our generation, the Millennials, will
finally and fully realize a sustainable and fair economy for everyone,
regardless of what zip code or school district you were born into. Everyone
should be able to meet their basic needs and have a chance of fulfilling
their dreams.
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). “If Dr. King were alive,” Ms. McGhee
emphasized, “he would be calling on people—particularly young people—to address
economic justice in this country.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Heather McGhee, A Message to Millennials: We Are the Children of Dr. King’s
Dream, HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/heather-mcghee/a-message-to-millennials-_b_1208971.html (last updated
Mar. 18, 2012, 5:12 AM); Susan R. Jones, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy: An
Economic Justice Imperative, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2005).
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A
For some time, I have thought that Title VII would have
been better off had the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) been transformed into an administrative
enforcement and strong policy-making agency like the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)—the very thing that more than
a few in Congress sought to avoid in 1964.131 I still believe that
route provides the best chance to improve enforcement.132
However, political reality sets in and creates a virtually
unscalable wall. The Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel
Canning133 means that any administrative agency with
adjuratory functions against business can be held hostage to the
political dysfunction that has poisoned our advice-and-consent
process.
Just as the NLRB will remain chronically
understaffed—and therefore unable to make and enforce the law,
which was why the recess appointment power began to be used
more assertively—so, too, would a restructured EEOC. In fact, I
suspect that more than a few supporters of Noel Canning would
find a toothed EEOC to be of far greater threat and worthy of
diminution, denigration, and economic starvation than even the
NLRB.
B
Should we look then to state-level enforcement—through
state Fair Employment Practices (“FEP”) agencies? I had at one
time thought so, and that thought is shared by excellent
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131
E.g., Johnson, supra note 51, at 1351; see Katherine A. Macfarlane, The
Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on “Jurisdictional” Exhaustion Grounds:
How Federal Courts Require That Allegations Be Presented to an Agency Without the
Resources To Consider Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 213, 213, 216, 229–32
(2011) (examining “Title VII and the EEOC, and contend[ing] that, far from
enforcing Title VII, the EEOC is no more than an administrative waiting room”).
132
And I am in some good company with those who have espoused that
viewpoint. See, e.g., Eleanor Holmes Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in
Interpretation—Survival Against the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681, 681 n.3 (1988).
Eleanor Holmes Norton chaired the EEOC during the presidency of Jimmy Carter.
See id.; see also Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is out There: Revamping Federal
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 193, 228 (2009) (“In light of this and other concerns, it might instead be
better for the agency to find facts and issue an order that is not self-enforcing but
which can be enforced in federal court if the employer does not comply, similar to
federal enforcement of the National Labor Relations Board orders.”).
133
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
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company.134 However, there are more than a few states where
enforcement is needed. In those states that need enforcement,
either no private-sector state FEP laws exist or are likely to be
enacted anytime soon, or the laws that do exist create a bare
cause of action without a state investigatory or enforcement
agency for the private sector.135 Furthermore, the same political
elements that oppose federal regulation of workplace activities
are equally active at the state level. Finally, even states with
long and distinguished records of FEP enforcement can have
judiciaries that boot opportunities to strengthen the application
of their own FEP laws, as Justice Goodwin Liu’s metaphysically
complex discussion of causation for the California Supreme Court
did to California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)

04/08/2016 13:04:55

C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 268 Side B

134
See Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Discrimination Law,
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545, 546 (2013) (urging independence from federal EDLs in
interpreting state FEP laws as befits their differing language, structure, and
legislative provenance). A renewed focus on state constitutionalism is a parallel
example. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
535, 548 (1986); Stephen Kanter, Sleeping Beauty Wide Awake: State Constitutions
as Important Independent Sources of Individual Rights, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
799, 810 (2011); Sanford Levinson, America’s “Other Constitutions”: The Importance
of State Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813, 813–14
(2010); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (1985); Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in
Protecting Individual Rights, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 651, 651 (1988); Robert F.
Williams, Response: Why State Constitutions Matter, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 901, 910–
11 (2011); see also Elizabeth Rodd, Light, Smoke, and Fire: How State Law Can
Provide Medical Marijuana Users Protection from Workplace Discrimination, 55 B.C.
L. REV. 1759, 1761–62 (2014).
135
Professor Sperino wrote, “All fifty states also have enacted statutes that
prohibit discrimination in the workplace.” Sperino, supra note 134, at 557. Sperino
backs that description up with abundant citations to specific statutes in each of the
fifty states. Id. at 557 n.109. Of the states cited, however, several do not have
antidiscrimination laws that (a) apply to private, as opposed to public, sector
employment and (b) do not provide a private right of action for aggrieved individuals
nor a state agency that investigates charges of discrimination against private-sector
employees. For example, the Georgia and Mississippi statutes cited apply only to
public-sector employers and employees, and there is no private-sector FEP agency.
See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-29 to 45-19-35 (1978), MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-103,
25-9-149 (1980). Similarly, the Arkansas Human Rights Act and the North Carolina
Equal Employment Practices Act, while applicable to the private sector, provide no
state FEP agency. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 143-422.2 (1977); see also Bonnie Hatchett, Arkansas Civil Rights Act of
1993, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, http://www.encyclopediaof
arkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=7312 (last updated June 19,
2015). The Alabama statute covers only age discrimination and provides no privatesector FEP agency. See ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to 25-1-28 (1997).
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in Harris v. City of Santa Monica.136 Given an opportunity to
strike a blow for enforcement by adopting a motivating factor
standard that would revolutionize FEHA litigation, the
California Supreme Court instead chose the curious via media of
adopting the confusing “substantial motivating factor test”:
Requiring the plaintiff to show that discrimination was a
substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating
factor, more effectively ensures that liability will not be imposed
based on evidence of mere thoughts or passing statements
unrelated to the disputed employment decision. At the same
time, for reasons explained above, proof that discrimination was
a substantial factor in an employment decision triggers the
deterrent purpose of the FEHA and thus exposes the employer
to liability, even if other factors would have led the employer to
make the same decision at the time.137

136

294 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2013).
Id. at 66, 51, 72 (emphasis omitted) (“A bus driver alleged that she was fired
by the City of Santa Monica (the City) because of her pregnancy in violation of the
prohibition on sex discrimination in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).
The City claimed that she had been fired for poor job performance. At trial, the City
asked the court to instruct the jury that if it found a mix of discriminatory and
legitimate motives, the City could avoid liability by proving that a legitimate motive
alone would have led it to make the same decision to fire her. The trial court refused
the instruction, and the jury returned a substantial verdict for the employee.”). The
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that “the requested
instruction was legally correct and that refusal to give it was prejudicial error.” Id.
Justice Liu’s opinion affirmed the remand for retrial, but at least struck a via media
so that although when “the employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same decision for lawful reasons, then the plaintiff cannot be
awarded damages, backpay, or an order of reinstatement,” at least “where
appropriate, the plaintiff may be entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief” and
“also may be eligible for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. at 72.
In this way, the California Supreme Court ended up essentially following the 1991
CRA provision, codified in § 706(g)(2)(B), that when a Title VII plaintiff makes a
motivating factor showing, the defendant can escape all but liability for declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
However, the California Supreme Court could have done much, much better for
enforcement of the FEHA, both by adopting a motivating factor standard, and by
finding, as the trial judge had, that once discrimination was proven to be a
motivating factor, all relief was available to plaintiff. Once again, it appears, we
have a state court seduced by the peculiarities of Title VII and the troublesome 1991
CRA amendments rather than striking out boldly against workplace bias by
strengthening its own state’s law beyond the confines of the federal paradigms. See
Sperino, supra note 134, at 569. At least one federal district judge in California,
however, has characterized the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Harris as a
“rigorous analysis of the FEHA’s language and purpose.” Steffens v. Regus Grp.,
PLC, No. 08cv1494–LAB (BLM), 2013 WL 4499112, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013).
137
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The result of the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris is
the almost proverbial, Solomonic split, resulting in a hybrid
standard that is likely to sew further confusion that in the end
will be more harmful to FEHA plaintiffs than helpful.
That is not to say that the EDL plaintiffs’ bar, allied with
groups that lobby for the interests of workers, should not push
the state agencies, legislatures, and courts to improve the
availability and quality of state FEP laws. They should take
particular heed from Professor Sandra Sperino’s important
admonition:
[C]ontinuing to interpret state law in tandem with federal law
is not sound. Rather, state and federal courts should interpret
state laws on their own merits, recognizing that few state
employment discrimination statutes mimic their federal
counterparts in all important respects. The differences in
language, structure, and legislative history counsel against
blindly interpreting state discrimination statutes in tandem
with their federal counterparts. In freeing state discrimination
law from the unnecessary complications of the federal
landscape, a second model can emerge that may persuade
federal decision makers to reconsider the various proof
structures and analytical frameworks they have adopted.138
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138
Sperino, supra note 134, at 590; see Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing
Deference: Learning Lessons from Recent Congressional Rejection of the Supreme
Court’s Interpretation of Discrimination Statutes, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 40, 42–43
(2009) (“Many federal and state courts apply interpretations of federal statutes
when interpreting the state regimes. Blanket acceptance of this statutory
construction principle is flawed for several reasons, some of which are highlighted
further by Congress’ recent rejection of so many Supreme Court interpretations of
discrimination law.” (footnote omitted)).
139
Goodpaster v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 849 N.W.2d 1, 4, 9–10 (Iowa 2014)
(citing Sperino, supra note 138, at 42) (reversing employer’s summary judgment).
140
Pippen v. State, 854 N.W.2d 1, 4, 14–15 (Iowa 2014) (citing Sperino, supra
note 134, at 546) (affirming employer’s summary judgment).
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This, however, can be a mixed bag, too. To be sure, some
courts reach to distinguish federal EDL when it helps to expand
or firm up the remedial aspects of a state’s FEP law;139 yet, even
within the same state, other courts have seized on the
independent state interpretation of its FEP law to restrict its
efficacy and reach.140
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C
While the 1991 CRA’s emendation of Title VII with § 703(m)
has been the focus of this Essay thus far, another provision of the
1991 CRA that merits some focus is § 118 of the Act, which was
not codified in Title VII, but rather expressed the congressional
view of the public policy surrounding alternative dispute
resolution (“ADR”) as a means of resolving EDL
claims—Congress was for ADR but said little about under what
circumstances.141
In the cases like the one that put employer-mandated
arbitration of EDL claims on the map, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,142 some employers undoubtedly
ended up losing the arbitration and quite possibly had greater
damages awarded to the former employee in arbitration than
would have been available to him in a federal court jury trial.143
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141
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081, 1081
(captioned “Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution”) (“Where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts
or provisions of Federal law amended by this title.”); see Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and
Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or Justice Denied, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 185, 188–90 (2011). See generally Angelito Remo Sevilla, The End of Duffield
and the Rise of Mandatory Arbitration: How Courts Misinterpreted the Civil Rights
Act’s Arbitration Provision, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2005). For discussion of § 118’s
legislative history, see, for example, EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps,
303 F.3d 994, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2002) (Pregerson, J., dissenting), and EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 754, 759–61 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
142
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
143
See George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its
Ramifications and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 177, 190–92 & nn.80–82 (1998). One commentator noted:
A basic question not addressed by the Court in Gilmer was whether the
case’s holding extends beyond the securities regulation context. That is,
should statutory discrimination claims generally be subject to compulsory
arbitration by private, unregulated arbitrators? Throughout Gilmer, the
Court emphasizes the extensive self-regulation of the securities industry
and the protections built into the arbitral system. For example, in rejecting
the “generalized attack” on the fairness of the arbitral proceeding, the
Court asserts that “NYSE arbitration rules, which are applicable to the
dispute in this case, provide protection against biased panels.” . . . It is at
least arguable that securities arbitration is highly regulated and thus
procedurally fair, and that the predominantly older-white-male arbitrators
would be generally more sympathetic to the predominantly white male
securities-industry ADEA plaintiffs. The same cannot be said for the nonsecurities, non-ADEA context.
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But these early cases seemed to arise mostly under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act144—which was the only
federal antidiscrimination statute that Gilmer itself subjected to
employer-mandated arbitration at the time145 whose cabined
damages provisions146 offset the availability of jury trial.147 In the
wake of Gilmer, some commentators sounded a hopeful note that
with federal court delay and expense, arbitration of EDL claims
might prove advantageous to individuals.148 Others condemned it
from the beginning, dubbing employer-mandated arbitration of
EDL claims “the yellow dog contract of the 1990s.”149 In the
twenty-three years since Gilmer was handed down, empirical
studies have been done of the fate of EDL claims in arbitration,
despite the difficulties posed by the extent of private and
unpublished awards.150 Some—primarily older—studies showed
that employees enjoyed an advantage in arbitration; but later,
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Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
347, 370, 372 & n.170 (1997) (footnote omitted) (“ADEA claims are predominantly
brought by white men with relatively high-status, well-paid jobs, and they primarily
allege discriminatory discharge.” (citing George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The
Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 491
(1995)).
144
Jenifer A. Magyar, Case Comment, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in
Arbitration: Analysis of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV.
641, 641–42 (1992).
145
Id.; see also Matthews, supra note 143, at 371 (“Yet without much discussion,
the lower courts have extended the decision in Gilmer beyond the ADEA context,
finding mandatory arbitration clauses enforceable for a range of statutory claims,
including those arising under Title VII, the ADA, the Equal Pay Act, and
42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
146
See, e.g., Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE
L. REV. 1093, 1203–08 & n.366 (1993).
147
Id. at 1206–07 n.365; see, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
148
See Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration
Requirements a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking To Avoid Litigating Statutory
Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1028–29 (1996). See
generally Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998).
149
See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER U.
L. REV. 1017 (1996). Another view expressed was that Gilmer’s opening of the
Pandora’s box of arbitrating EDL claims might lead to sufficient judicial supervision
of the arbitral process among a discrete group of arbitration providers that, over
time, gives rise to de facto, European-style “labor courts.” Robert N. Covington,
Employment Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United
States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 345, 411–15 (1998).
150
See, e.g., Chew, supra note 141, at 193.
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and more extensive, studies suggested that employees fare
considerably worse in arbitration than they have in federal
court.151 Reporting a study that she undertook to compare
arbitral with judicial results in racial harassment cases,
Professor Chew of the University of Pittsburgh reached some
sobering conclusions:
Arbitration is not really a distinct and alternative dispute
resolution system, but instead appears increasingly coordinated
with the judicial system. . . . Arbitrators routinely cite legal
principles and legal cases as precedents. Arbitrators resolve the
dispute and impose that resolution on the parties, and their
awards are generally not reviewable by the courts. Some
arbitrators are reaching conclusions that are ordinarily
reserved for judges—for instance, granting the employer’s
motion for summary judgment.
This qualitative analysis
provides consistent evidence that arbitrators are beginning to
sound, think, and act like judges.152

Moreover, Professor Chew found evidence of some of the
same attitudes of arbitrators that were evidenced by most of the
federal appeals judges involved in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.:

152
153
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Id. at 195–98, 204, 207 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 206–07 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted).
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[A]rbitrators not only cite legal principles, they tend to interpret
these principles in the same way as do judges, adhering to the
same paradigm of racial harassment. Namely, they expressly
focus on old-fashioned blatant and egregious racism, while
discounting or ignoring modern racism as evidence of racial
harassment.
Also, even when they noted the employees’
allegations of old-fashioned racism, arbitrators nonetheless
found them insufficient to hold for the employee. For example,
in cases in which employees complained of racial slurs . . . or
other forms of explicit racism, arbitrators nonetheless concluded
that racial harassment had not occurred.
If anything,
arbitrators were less persuaded than judges by employees’
allegations of explicit racism. Arbitrators frequently reasoned
that the harassment was not “severe or pervasive” enough to
create a racially hostile environment for the employee. In some
of the cases, arbitrators expressly doubted the employees’
credibility or questioned the employees’ own subjective belief
that their harassment was race based, instead being persuaded
by the employers’ telling of the story.153
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This is disturbing news; but it should not be surprising. If
federal judges—who enjoy life tenure on good behavior—are
reluctant to see what is before them, why should we expect
arbitrators, who make a living hearing cases but are selected
from panels of arbitrators on a case by case basis—with
employers exercising heavier influence and with more access to
information on the arbitrator’s past rulings—to be more
courageous or engaged in the struggle on which President
Johnson launched our nation when he signed Title VII into law a
half of a century ago?154
Still, arbitration may offer the best hope—through a
combination of initiatives by the leading arbitration services,
reformed arbitration rules and practices from industries where
EDL claims are frequently arbitrated, and reformatory
regulation by the EEOC and Congress.155 If the American
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154
See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost—How the Gilmer Court Lost the
Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 5, 7, 19 (1994).
155
A very recent study of the ADR program of the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) shows the potential for fairer arbitral results
offered by reformed procedures and increased EDL training requirements for
arbitrators who hear employment-related disputes. J. Ryan Lamare & David B.
Lipsky, Employment Arbitration in the Securities Industry: Lessons Drawn from
Recent Empirical Research, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 113, 131–33 (2014).
FINRA regulates some 5,000 securities firms in the United States, along with
633,000 representatives in those firms. Id. at 115. “One of FINRA’s primary
responsibilities involves the administration of an ADR program for the resolution of
disputes between customers and brokers (seventy-five percent of all filings), brokers
and brokers (two percent of filings), and employees and their firms (twenty-three
percent of filings).” Id. at 115–16. Of particular interest to us are the following
features of FINRA’s employee-firm arbitration procedures:
The system provides different rules for arbitrations concerning statutory
discrimination claims. For instance, the maximum filing fee for
discrimination claims is $200, whereas the fee can rise as high as $1,800
for non-discrimination cases. In addition, beginning in 2000, FINRA
instituted stricter requirements regarding the composition of arbitration
panels when discrimination has been alleged. In these cases, tripartite
panels must consist of all public arbitrators (rather than a mixture of
public and industry arbitrators), and the chair (or sole) arbitrator cannot
have primarily represented employers or employees in the past five years.
Id. at 117 (footnotes omitted). The authors’ empirical study led them to conclude,
among other things, that “FINRA’s rule changes in 2000, designed to enhance the
fairness and due process protections of complaints in discrimination cases, proved to
have a very significant positive effect on the outcomes obtained by complainants in
arbitration cases.” Id. at 131. Indeed, “the rules FINRA used to protect employeedisputants appear to have had dramatic effects on arbitration awards, suggesting
that procedural safeguards may be more important than whether an arbitration
program is mandatory or voluntary.” Id. at 131–32. While FINRA arbitrations of
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Arbitration Association and the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (“FMCS”), for example, were to provide
additional training courses for arbitrators to learn how to use
evidence from the social sciences156 as part of their approach to
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C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 272 Side A

EDL claims have not yet reached what the authors would consider full parity with
court-outcomes—depending, of course, how one factors in the premature demise of so
many EDL claims in federal court under the sway of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56—the FINRA approach provides a very useful template on which to build better
and fairer systems of EDL claim arbitration:
But our analysis also suggests that employees in the securities industry
with discrimination complaints fared less well than employees with other
types of claims. Again, we lack the data to estimate what employees with
discrimination complaints might have received had they litigated their
claims. What we have uncovered, however, is prima facie evidence that, all
other things considered, in the securities industry arbitrators treat
employees with discrimination complaints less favorably than they treat
employees with non-discrimination claims. This result may stem from the
fact that arbitrators are more reluctant to find that an employer has
violated a statute than they are to find that an employer has breached a
contract. Lastly, we find that, controlling for other relevant factors, women
have obtained lower arbitration awards than men in the securities
industry. On the one hand, critics might add this finding to their arsenal of
objections to employment arbitration. On the other hand, our evidence
suggests that the effect of gender on arbitration awards probably results
from long-standing employment practices in the securities industry and not
from the nature of the arbitration process itself. Clearly, there is no
evidence to support the proposition that arbitrators consciously
discriminate against women complainants in the industry. In sum, in
common with other researchers, we find that employment arbitration in the
securities industry potentially has defects identified by critics of the
practice. However, we also find that the regime of rules used by the
provider can substantially correct those defects. For instance, where other
arbitral forums (namely, AAA) have been studied, evidence indicates that
there is at least the potential for bias to affect arbitration outcomes.
However, in our study of FINRA, using generally comparable data, we find
no such evidence of bias. As such, we argue that employment arbitration
systems should not be considered monolithic in nature—the problems with
arbitration that might have occurred under one regime may be less present,
or nonexistent, under a different system. Specifically, we maintain that the
FINRA approach to arbitration serves as a useful template for designing a
system that limits many of the concerns around employment arbitration.
The FINRA system has strict arbitrator training and disclosure
requirements (especially for discrimination claims), employs a randomized
and automated selection process, and makes arbitrator decisions publicly
available.
Id. at 132.
156
Bankruptcy Judge Stan Bernstein suggested this for his judicial brethren
who are faced with “tension between ‘doing justice’ in the individual case and at the
same time considering the impact of a decision on readily identifiable institutions.”
In re Awuku, 248 B.R. 21, 25 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Those of us who came to law
after years of professional training in the social or policy sciences struggle to
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arbitrated EDL cases, a finer-tuned, more well-informed, and
more holistic instrument could be created for detecting the
twenty-first century incarnations of employment discrimination,
without the difficulties that individual plaintiffs face in
introducing such evidence in federal court.157 Moreover, had
Congress empowered the EEOC to issue regulations to
implement § 118 of the 1991 CRA, those regulations could limn
the contours of a fair and even-handed arbitral program that
could make arbitration a viable alternative to federal court
litigation for employers and employees alike.158
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reconcile the traditional common law approach with the systemic perspective of our
earlier studies. The Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit, the Honorable Richard A.
Posner, is the most insistent voice in calling for a pragmatic jurisprudence that
requires judges in rendering their decisions to give sufficient weight to the
perspectives of the social sciences . . . .”). But see In re Taylor, in which District
Judge Hellerstein rejected the social science role because “[t]he bankruptcy court
allowed its notion of ‘pragmatic jurisprudence’ to affect a proper reading of Title 11
of the Bankruptcy Code.” 248 B.R. 37, 41 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (footnote omitted),
vacated on other grounds, 243 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001).
157
Cutting-edge work being done in this area includes Tanya Katerí Hernández,
One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination Cases—The Implicit
Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence, 32 LAW & INEQ. 309
(2014). As Professor Hernandez concludes, “without an implicit bias research social
framework, plaintiffs . . . are left struggling to explain the unexplainable—the
existence of racially distinctive treatment without any overt employer references to
race-based justifications or stereotypes,” but “[w]ith an implicit bias research social
framework, a fact-finder has a lens for identifying how, even in the absence of
racially biased or stereotyped employer statements, racially differentiated treatment
can be explained by socially pervasive implicit bias.” Id. at 346.
158
It is worth noting in this context that jury trials of Title VII claims are not a
panacea for the victims of discrimination who have the courage and fortitude to
become plaintiffs. Professor Wendy Parker’s findings on jury determinations in post1991 CRA Title VII cases offer a sobering picture of juries who seem to prefer some
classes of plaintiffs over others:
[I]f plaintiffs present their cases to juries—the stage at which they enjoy
their highest chance of success—losses are still likely. Nor are trials
without risks for plaintiffs. In my Study of 102 jury trials and 10 bench
trials, plaintiffs were much more likely to be ordered to write defendants a
check—for the defendants’ costs—than the other way around. Most
troubling, this is not a story of equality. Plaintiffs win most often before
juries, but jury win rates differ with the category of plaintiff. For example,
this Study reveals that African Americans and Latinos claiming race
discrimination have the lowest jury win rates. Empirical studies of
employment discrimination litigation usually do not distinguish among the
types of discrimination alleged or the types of plaintiffs involved. The very
few that do have also found that African Americans have lower win rates at
various procedural stages. No study examining this issue has found
differently. Thus, although my evidence is far from overwhelming—I
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Unfortunately, Congress has been stingy with delegating
rulemaking authority to the EEOC, and even where that
authority has been delegated—as it was, for example, with
respect to portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act—the courts have cabined
that authority considerably.159
The 1964 Congress pulled
substantive rulemaking authority from the EEOC, leaving it only
with authority to make “procedural regulations.”160 While the
EEOC has issued policy statements opposing mandatory
arbitration obligation, it currently lacks the power161 to issue
regulations outright that would define the acceptable limits of
mandatory arbitration programs162 after their full blessing by the
Supreme Court in 2001.163 The agency might consider issuing
cause determinations in any case where an employer-mandated
arbitration agreement in the background does not conform to
certain procedural regulations—or even simply pursuing the
claims on behalf of the employee since the Supreme Court has
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analyze only 102 jury trials—it adds to the increasing evidence of
inequality.
Parker, supra note 35, at 210–11 (footnotes omitted). No easy solutions to this
phenomenon are at hand. “Why African Americans and Latinos have depressed win
rates—a finding not unique to this jury study—could possibly be explained by biases
jurors typically bring to the jury room, and an increase in jury diversity could
possibly help to ameliorate some of this bias.” Id. at 238.
159
See, e.g., Shawn D. Vance, How the Supreme Court’s Toyota Decision
Impacted the View of EEOC’s Regulatory Authority, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
475, 493 (2005).
160
See, e.g., RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND
EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 78–79 (1997).
161
See generally Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the
EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3–5, 19–35 (1999) (discussing the EEOC Policy Statement
on Mandatory Arbitration issued on July 10, 1997); Beth M. Primm, Comment, A
Critical Look at the EEOC’s Policy Against Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151, 160 (1999).
162
BALES, supra note 160, at 85–88.
163
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 120 (2001). Of the Adams
case, leading management-side employment-law practitioners have observed that
the Supreme Court “reached a decision that is certain to have a significant effect on
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements in the non-union employment
setting.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.: The
Court Addresses the Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, JONES DAY
(Aug. 2001), http://www.jonesday.com/icircuit-city-stores-inc-v-adamsi-and-ieeoc-vwaffle-house-inci-the-court-addresses-the-enforceability-of-mandatory-arbitrationagreements-08-01-2001/. Practitioners explain, “Agreeing with the overwhelming
majority of Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court held in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams that valid arbitration agreements between most employers and
employees are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).” Id.
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held that employer-employee arbitration agreements have no
effect on EEOC enforcement suits164—but given scarce resources,
this would likely prove little more than a bluff, which the federal
courts would call165 and Congress would punish.166
D
What about the President’s authority to bind federal
contractors—a substantial class of employers in the United
States with the largest businesses—to impose reform through
Executive Order? President Obama has been using Executive
Orders to give bite to a variety of employment laws in his second
term. For example, on July 31, 2014, President Obama signed an
Executive Order, entitled “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” that
forbids companies with more than one million dollars in
government contracts to require mandatory arbitration of
employee claims “arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or any tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or
harassment.”167
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164
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The Court left open the
possibility, however, that the EEOC’s subsequent suit might very well be limited by
an arbitration award on the claim or by a settlement reached between employer and
employee as part of the arbitral process. Id. at 297.
165
Federal courts have called similar bluffs in EEOC attempts to use litigation
to oppose mandatory arbitration in the days before the Supreme Court handed down
Circuit City. See BALES, supra note 160, at 85–86.
166
Similarly, Congress punished the NLRB in the 1990s by cutting its budget
when it was considering rulemaking to expedite the union election process. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB—A
MEMOIR (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, Hardball, Politics, and the NLRB, 22
BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 507 (2001) (reviewing GOULD, supra).
167
Exec. Order No. 13,673, § 6(a), 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309, 45,314 (July 31, 2014);
see Jon A. Geier et al., New “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” Executive Order Places
Unprecedented Demands on Federal Contractors, PAUL HASTINGS (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=70bae169-2334-6428811c-ff00004cbded#page=1. The implementation of this Executive Order is described
by the management attorneys at Paul Hastings as a combination of carrot and stick:
This Executive Order is effective immediately and will apply to all
solicitations for federal contracts as set forth in final rules issued by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) Council. It will, however, be
implemented on new contracts “in stages on a prioritized basis, during
2016,” according to the White House fact sheet. The proposed regulations
by the FAR Council and related guidance from the Secretary of Labor will
further outline the parameters of these new obligations. As contractors
await the proposed regulations and guidance, they should at a minimum
evaluate their existing or contemplated arbitration programs to determine
whether, and if so how, they may be impacted by the Executive Order.
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Id. The operative language is section 6 of the Executive Order:
(a) Agencies shall ensure that for all contracts where the estimated value of
the supplies acquired and services required exceeds $1 million, provisions
in solicitations and clauses in contracts shall provide that contractors agree
that the decision to arbitrate claims arising under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or
harassment may only be made with the voluntary consent of employees or
independent contractors after such disputes arise. Agencies shall also
require that contractors incorporate this same requirement into
subcontracts where the estimated value of the supplies acquired and
services required exceeds $1 million.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to contracts or subcontracts
for the acquisition of commercial items or commercially available off-theshelf items.
(c) A contractor’s or subcontractor’s agreement under subsection (a) of this
section to arbitrate certain claims only with the voluntary post-dispute
consent of employees or independent contractors shall not apply with
respect to:
(i) employees who are covered by any type of collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the contractor and a labor organization
representing them; or
(ii) employees or independent contractors who entered into a valid contract
to arbitrate prior to the contractor or subcontractor bidding on a contract
covered by this order, except that a contractor’s or subcontractor’s
agreement under subsection (a) of this section to arbitrate certain claims
only with the voluntary post-dispute consent of employees or independent
contractors shall apply if the contractor or subcontractor is permitted to
change the terms of the contract with the employee or independent
contractor, or when the contract is renegotiated or replaced.
Exec. Order No. 13,673, § 6, 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,314. Emily Bazelon, writing for Slate,
placed this most recent Executive Order in the context of a series of Executive
Orders issued since January 2014:
Last month [that is, June 2014], [President] Obama banned federal
contractors from discriminating against gay workers. . . . [That followed an
Executive Order issued] in January raising the minimum wage for new
federal contractors to $10.10 an hour.
. . . [T]he latest executive order . . . packs the biggest punch. “This is one of
the most important positive steps for civil rights in the last 20 years,” Paul
Bland, executive director of Public Justice, a public-interest law group, says
of the July 31 order. The employer-side law firm Littler Mendelson calls it
“the most sweeping order to date” that the Obama administration has
aimed at federal contractors.
....
. . . [Paul] Bland argues that [although the Executive Order’s reach is
limited to that subset of federal contractors with federal contracts worth
over $ 1 million,] it's still a huge deal because it treats forced arbitration as
a central civil rights issue. “For the President of the United States to say
that this is a substantial priority of his Administration, to the point that
the United States will refuse to contract with corporations that force their
workers into arbitration, is an enormous marker,” he wrote . . . .
Maybe someday, this will inspire some other Congress to throw the blanket
over everyone. That used to happen, I swear. When the Supreme Court
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made it harder for employees to win discrimination suits in the 1980s,
Congress responded with a 1991 law that rolled back those rulings. The
same dynamic was in play when the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act passed in
2009, and Congress stuck up for workers complaining of unequal pay (but
didn’t address mandatory arbitration, because it wasn’t widespread yet).
Obama’s new order is one way to push back against a conservative
Supreme Court majority with a strikingly pro-business record.
Emily Bazelon, Obama Is on a Pro-Labor Roll, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/obama_execu
tive_order_on_mandatory_arbitration_huge_news_for_workers_rights.html.
The
president also recently issued Executive Order 11,478 that emends Executive Order
11,246 to prohibit federal contractors from discriminating against their employees
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. David Hudson, President
Obama Signs a New Executive Order To Protect LGBT Workers, WHITE HOUSE (July
21, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/07/21/president-obamasigns-new-executive-order-protect-lgbt-workers. President Obama is in good
historical company in using Executive Orders to create nondiscrimination in a
significant sector of the economy—federal governmental contractors—as a harbinger
of reform for the private sector more broadly:
In 1941, under pressure from Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters union
president A. Philip Randolph and a burgeoning civil rights movement,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which
required that defense contracts include provisions to bar private
contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color or national
origin. The order also established the President’s Committee on Fair
Employment Practice, which was empowered to investigate discrimination
cases and “to take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it finds to
be valid.”
John Nichols, Congressional Republicans Call Obama ‘Lawless’ for Issuing Executive
Orders. That’s Just Wrong., NATION, (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/
blog/178318/house-republicans-called-obama-lawless-using-executive-orders-thats-ju
st-wrong; see also John Nichols, By John Boehner’s Logic, a Lot of Presidents Should
Have Been Sued, NATION, (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/johnboehners-logic-lot-presidents-should-have-been-sued/ [hereinafter Nichols, By John
Boehner’s Logic]. The fight against employment discrimination was more often than
not led by a succession of Executive Orders after 8802—that is, Exec. Order No.
9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (May 27, 1943) (President Roosevelt) (applying the
antidiscrimination requirements of Executive Order 8802 to all government
contractors); Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (President
Truman) (banning discrimination based on “race, color, religion or national origin” in
the U.S. military, and establishing “a high-level committee to investigate instances
of bias and to make recommendations for how to eliminate it”); Exec. Order No.
10,308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Dec. 3, 1951) (President Truman) (creating the
“Committee on Government Contract Compliance, which was charged with assuring
that federal contractors continued, in the post–World War II era, to comply with the
non-discrimination provisions of Executive Order 8802”); Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18
Fed. Reg. 4899 (Aug. 13, 1953) (President Eisenhower) (establishing “the President’s
Advisory Committee on Government Organization (an expansion of the Government
Contract Committee) to assure that federal contractors respected all antidiscrimination orders and initiatives, declaring ‘It is the obligation of the contracting
agencies of the United States Government and government contractors to ensure
compliance with, and successful execution of, the equal employment opportunity
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Perhaps rather than stopping with the issuance of an
Executive Order banning compulsory arbitration for employees of
million-dollar federal contractors, President Obama’s legal team
should develop an Executive Order that creates a fair,
transparent, and effective system of EDL arbitration that all
federal contractors must adopt, following some of the more
enlightened thinking on the subject of how to make arbitration
work for employment claimants,168 particularly for the millions
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program of the United States Government.’ ”); Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg.
1977 (Mar. 6, 1961) (President Kennedy) (requiring “government contractors to ‘take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color or national
origin,’ ” and creating “the President’s Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity . . . to work with federal agencies to advance the initiative”); Exec.
Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965) (President Johnson)
(prohibiting “federal contractors and federally assisted construction contractors and
subcontractors, who do over $10,000 in Government business in one year, from
discriminating in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”). According to the Department of Labor:
Executive Order 11246, as amended and further strengthened over the
years, remains a major safeguard, protecting the rights of workers
employed by federal contractors—approximately one-fifth of the entire US
labor force—to remain free from discrimination on the basis of their gender,
race, religion, color or national origin . . . and opening the doors of
opportunity through its affirmative action provisions.
John Nichols, By John Boehner’s Logic, supra (omission in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). These Executive Orders have been a “major safeguard,
protecting the rights of workers employed by federal contractors—approximately
one-fifth of the entire U.S. labor force—to remain free from discrimination on the
basis of their gender, race, religion, color or national origin . . . and opening the
doors of opportunity through its affirmative action provisions.” Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, History of Executive Order 11246, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/ca_11246.htm
(omission
in
original).
168
See, e.g., Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More
Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081, 1083–84 (2009);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 810–12 (2008); see also Ariana R. Levinson, What the
Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 46
U. MICH J.L. REFORM 789, 790 (2013). In addition, such an Executive Order should
tackle, to the maximum extent possible, how to limit judicial review through the
arbitration agreement itself, so that management-oriented courts are not tempted to
begin imposing the whole McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine regime on EDL arbitrations.
See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and
Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 167,
172 (2008). Finally, the Executive Order should establish boundaries for the arbitral
process that minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recognized phenomenon of
“the repeat player effect”—to prevent the advantage that can be gained by “repeat
player defendants (e.g., employers) in mandatory employment arbitration settings
because of their ability to structure the process to their advantage.” Edward
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who lack169 the fortitude and financial backing of a John Hithon
to wage a twenty-year federal court battle for justice when they
have been discriminated against by their employers. That might
very well provide the best shot to end the strangeness of
§ 703(m)’s career over the last quarter of a century and thereby,
at last, to create an environment in which the promise of the
1991 CRA might actually approach meaningful fulfillment.
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Silverman, Article, The Suspicious Existence of the “Repeat Player Effect” in
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/suspicious-existence-repeat-player-effect-mand
atory-arbitration-employment-disputes.
169
See St. Antoine, supra note 168, at 790–92, 810, 812.

